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INTRODUCTION
Deep Sea Bed Mining has been a topic of considerable debate
since it became technically and economically viable as a mining
venture in the mid 1960's. The availability of manganese nodules
has been determined through costly "prospecting" operations and
their existence in sufficient quantity and quality has been
found to be , adequate for the mining industry . . The means by
which the industry will recoyer the nodules has been limited
to three current designs. A continuous line of buckets seems
to be the simplest method in terms of capital outlay and ease
of maintenance. The use of a suction lift seems to be the most
widespread design due to its relative ease of operation; however,
it requires a much larger capital investment and much higher
maintenance costs. The newest design (touted by a French Con-
sortium) has been one which employs remotely controlled drones.
They are released on the surface, "swim" to the bottom, scoop
up a load of nodules and return to the surface where their load
is received by the parent vessel.
The processing of the nodules \vill be an expensive operation
compared to processing costs of current ores obtained from the
land sites. Recent developments and innovations in the leaching
process have served to reduce the cost somewhat. The processing
costs may be reduced by technological breakthrough in the future,
but they cannot be predicted.
4
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The capital outlays which must be made by industry in order
to proceed with deep sea mining is staggering. Prior to moving
ahead with their investment, members of the industry Hould like
to ensure that they will in fact be allowed to capitalize on
the harvesting of manganese nodules. This point is the subject
of heated debate in the ongoing United Nations Convention for
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) negotiations. One of the many
points covered by UNCLOS is the ownership of the nodules and
who will be allowed to exploit them. With this item undecided,
industry has turned to the U.S. Government for assistance and
has found some consolation in the form of the Hard Minerals Act
(passed by the Carter administration) which is pushing the U.N.
Nego~iations towards a more timely settlement. In addition,
the Reagan administration has instructed the U.S. delegation
not to complete the treaty until a new policy review takes place
to determine whether the new draft offers the industry access
to the nodules on fair and reasonable terms.
In addition to its attrative appeal to the ocean mining
industry, the processing of manganese nodules will offer the
U.S. mineral independence in three of the four major metals
found in the nodules. This will reduce the probability of
economic action against the U.S. by mineral cartels similar
to those actions taken by OPEC and Alumina/Bauxite producers.
The minerals associated with manganese nodule mining are con-
sidered to be strategic minerals. They are used throughout
5
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the defense industry and more alarmingly, with the exception of
copper~ we rely heavily on imports from politically unstable
regions of the world.
Although deep sea bed mining has tremendous economic and
political advantages, we must bear in mind that it is only part
of the current UNCLOS negotiations and its merit must be weighed
with other impo~t~nt issues. To sacrifice the negotiations for
one issue alone would be tragic and could inflict irrepairable
damage upon the U.N. as a negotiating body and upon all countries
depending on the freedom of the oceans for trade, transportation
and resources.
"In the meantime, the new industry of deep ocean mining lands
in a political limbo. It moves tentatively forward only on the
strength of the new federal law, knowing that a U.N. treaty could
later drive the business beyond hope of return. Whether nodules
will ever be collected will likely remain unanswered for some
time.
In a world of shortages and rising expectations, there will
always be a new technological horizon. The history of nodule
mining, however, shows that future industries must fit into an
increasingly complex environmental and political order that is
itself a frontier effort. Clever technology alone may no longer
solve the world's problems."l
IJanet L. Hopson, "Miners are Reaching for Met a I Riches on
the Ocean's Floor." Smithsonian, April 1981, p. 58.
6
Though the future of the nodule mining is undetermined, it
is the· purpose of this paper to determine its impact on the
national management of its associated strategic minerals and
national security.
7
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PART I
STRATEGIC MINERALS
8
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CHAPTER 1: STOCKPILING STRATEGIC MINERALS
Since 1946 the U.S. has maintained stockpiles of strategic
materials sufficient in size to ensure the availability of
essential minerals in the event of war. "Ostensibly limited
to use during national wartime emergencies, the strategic
stockpiles are intended to assure adequate critical mineral
supplies during -periods of stringencies. The very existence
of the U.S. strategic stockpile program has also provided some
preemptive protection against administered price increases and
politically motivated shortages."l
The stockpile program originated in the Strategic and
Critical Materials Stockpiling Act of 1946. The passage of
this act seems to have been a direct result of shortages and
severances of essential materials during World War II. With
WWI I fresh in everyone's mind, the act wa s wr i t ten in an effort.
to reduce or prevent a reoccurrence of these shortages. The
act, as it appears in SO U.S.C. 98, says:
"That the natural resources of the United States in certain
strategic and critical materials being deficient or insufficiently
developed to supply the industrial, military and Naval needs of
the country for common defense, it is the policy of the Congress
IJames A. Jordan and Robert A. Kilmarx, Strategic Mineral
Dependence: The Stockpile Dilemma. The Washington Papers Volume
VII No. 70 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1979),
p. 39.
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and the purpose and intent of this act to provide for the
acquisition and retention of stocks of these materials and
to encourage the conservation and development of sources of
these materials within the United States, and thereby decrease
and prevent wherever possible a dangerous and costly dependence
of the United States upon foreign nations for supplies of these
materials in times of national emergency (emphasis added) .. "
In 1950~ the passage of the Defense Production Act was
intended to provide wide ranging authority and definite powers
for expanding the nations production capabilities. It includes
arrangements for the purchase of strategic materials and supports
the mining of essential minerals. The policy established by
this act is stated in 50 U.S.C. 2062 and follows:
"In view of the present international situation and in order
to provide for the national defense and national security, our
mobilization effort continues to require some diversion of
certain materials and facilities from civilian use to military
and related purposes. It also requires the development of pre-
paredness programs and the expansion of productive capacity and
supply beyond the levels needed to meet the civilian demand, in
order to reduce the time required for full mobilization in the
event of an attack on the United States."
Stockpile objectives and actual levels were kept secret by
the Executive Branch up until 1962. Since that time examinations
by Congress have shown such irregular variations in the objective
10
levels that there appears to have been reasons other than
national security for those changes. The period of 1963-1973
resulted ln major fluctuations in the level of the stockpile
due chiefly to the high usage rate of strategic minerals
during the Vietnam War era.
In 1973, the stockpiles were in less than an ideal condition.
Several mineralsw~re liquidated and the administration decided
to reduce the stockpile objectives to those necessary to support
a one year military contingency, or rather, an orderly mobiliza-
tion of the national economy for the duration of the conflict.
With this in mind, it is easy to understand the complexity of
factors which determine the size of each minerals stockpiles
objective. Those minejals which have no substitutes or whose
supply lines are less than dependable would require a much
larger reserve than one which is easily and dependably obtained.
Due to a great deal of congressional criticism concerning
the condition of the stockpile, the Ford administration
initiated an extensive review of this policy in 1975. Based
on the results of the inter-agency review, chaired by the
Federal Preparedness Agency of the GSA, the stockpiles 'vere
returned to a 3 year contingency level and included both civil-
ian and defense needs.
The Carter administration set an additional requirement
that the u.S. must be able to support a 1 year NATO war in
Europe on not more than a 30 day notice. This change has
11
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caused an extensive review of current stores in the area of
quality more than quantity. The short 'time frame required
here demands an increased availability of finished metals
rather than the availability of unprocessed ore s.
Most recently, the national stockpiles have been the sources
of considerable campaign rhetoric during the 1980 presidential
campaign. The major focus was on the growing dependence of
the United States on minerals supplied by small African coun-
tries whose reliability as a continuing source is questionable.
This controversy resulted in the Materials Policy, Research and
Development Act of 1979. "The bill requires the president to
return to Congress ... a plan for implementing and establishing
a national minerals policy and promoting industrial innovations
in materials technology. The Defense Department within the
same year must submit a list of critical materials needs
related to national security,"Z
This most recent turn of events has expressed an under
current of tense awareness of the criticality of minerals sup-
plied by foreign countries and our inability to control these
supplies. This situation is supporting the call for increased
stockpiles as we are trying to ensure against interruptions
of critical supplies as a result of intentional or unintentional
actions. The formation of OPEC as a viable oil cartel, the
Z"Minerals Emerge As Campaign Issue," Aviation Week &Space
Technology, October ZO, 1980, p. 115.
lZ
actions of aluminum producers impos~ng substantial export taxes
and the political unrest in undeveloped countries have jointly
undermined our confidence in maintaining an uninterrupted
supply of critical/strategic minerals.
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CHAPTER 2: MINERAL DEPENDENCE
Of- the 24 major non-fuel minerals required by industry~
the u.s. is less than 30% self sufficient in 21 of them. Con-
trary to popular opinion the u.s. imports approximately two
thirds of its minerals from industrialized countries. This
number in itself is encouraging as the industrialized coun-
tries represent · a stability and reliability of · supply. Un-
fortunately, very few of the critical minerals are obtained
from these dependable countries. Many of the more necessary
minerals must be obtained from less reliable sources.
The reliability of the less developed countries varies a
great deal and many are not very reliable at all. In 1976
there was a considerable number of problems experienced in-
ternally in Zaire and Zambia wh i ch resul ted in a "cutoff" of
approximately 8 percent of the \.,-orld's cobalt supply and
delayed ongoing improvements to their production capabilities.
This resulted in less cobalt and increased prices. "The price
rise in cobalt alone caused, for example, price increases for
the FIOO engine (jet) of almost S18,000., the J79 engine,
$21,000., and TF39~ $21,000.1'1
This example encouraged a careful review of worldwide
materials availability and vulnerability. A relatively small
lClarence A. Robinson, "Defense Science Board Urges Multi-
year Contracts. I' Aviation \~eek & Space Technology, December 1 J
1980, p. 132.
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number of materials emerged on "most vulnerable" lists produced
by several independent studies. "In nine such surveys, aluminum,
chromium and manganese appeared on seven lists. Cobalt, nickel,
tin and titanium appeared on six lists."Z From these surveys,
nine non-fuel minerals were identified as being most critical.
They are: manganese, aluminum, nickel, tungsten, copper, cobalt,
platinum, chromium and tin, and their sources are illustrated in
Figure 1.
"The U.S. problem ... is intensifed by the fact that world
reserves are highly concentrated in key cases. Only 3 countries
control over two thirds of five of the key minerals: 96.5% of
chromium, 90.5% of manganese, 99.7% of platinum, 74.6% of tungsten,
69.4% of nickel, and 69% of cobalt. Only two ... South Africa and
the USSR have ... dominance in platinum and manganese ... it is
noteworthy that for these ... key minerals dominated by two sup-
pliers, the U.S. has extremely high import dependence, 95% for
platinum and 98% for manganese .. "3
The substitutability of minerals is not always an option
and certainly not a possibility in a short time frame notifica-
tion of massive requirements from industry. With growing concern
over political stability of mineral rich countries and possible
ZJames A. Jordan and Robert A. Kilmarx, Strategic Mineral
Dependence: The Stockpile Dilemma. The Washington Papers,
Volume VII No. 70, (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications,
1979), p . ZO.
3 I b i d., p . 17.
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FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF fllINERAL RESOURCES
SOURCE: fu~OS A. JORDAN AND ROBERT A. KIL~~RX, STRATEGIC
MINERAL DEPENDENCE: THE STOCKP ILE DI LE}'L\1J\. THE
WASHINGTON PAPERS VOL VII, NO. 70, . (BEVERLY HILLS AND
LONDON: SAGE PUBLICATIONS, 1979) ," pp. 21-22.
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cartel action by 3rd world countries, the industrialized countries
are searching for new sources of minerals.
Political conflict in Zaire and Zambia (combined they control
42% of the world's cobalt) reduced the world's cobalt supply
temporarily. Political upheaval or sanctions imposed on South
Africa could seriously reduce the supply of manganese (45%),
platinum (71%) or chromium (74%), to name only the more critical
of their resources. One of the more right wing approaches also
addresses the U.S.S.R's long term plan to gain control of the
world's minerals through political upheaval or armed conflict
in an effort to control the industrial capabilities of the west.
Regardless of the method used, the possibility of reduced
supply of essential minerals exists. One source of minerals
which is available to the industrialized nations is the sea beds
of the world's oceans. The availability of manganese nodules is
still politically debatable but the economic opportunities are
enormous. Considering that the u.s. is self sufficient in copper,
the possibility of reducing our mineral dependence in manganese,
nickel and cobalt is encouraging indeed. Without even mentioning
the effect on our balance of payments, the mere fact that we can
become independent in 3 of the remaining 8 critical rniner~ls is
a cause for celebration.
The remainder of this report will concentrate on the capa-
bilities of the proposed ocean mining industry and the effects
which it will have on strategic minerals and national defense.
17
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Several assumptions must necessarily be made. The first is that
manganese nodule mining operation is limited by the shere com-
plexity of its apparatus and resulting restrictions on maneuver-
ability to being a peacetime industry only. It would be impossible
to defend a mining vessel against attack. This leads to the
second assumption. In that this source would only be viable
during peacetime, the stockpiles would necessarily have to remain
at a high level, but a defense against cartel action could be
assumed. The third assumption to be considered is the relative
unimportance of copper in this study as the U.S. is close to
self sufficiency in this mineral. This yields a fourth assump-
tion that seems to be somewhat of a reversal of the intentions
of th~ manganese nodule miners. Although nickel seems to be
driving the economic intentions of the industry, the greatest
advantage nationally appears to be the alleviation of import
dependence in cobalt, manganese and nickel. While the miners
have expressed little interest in processing the large amounts
of manganese, the loss of this import would in effect shut down
the U.S. steel industry.
18
"PART II
UNITED STATES' MINERAL POSTURE
OF
NICKEL
COPPER
COBALT
AND
MANGANESE
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CHAPTER 1: CURRENT CONSUMPTION
The industries of the United States have relied heavily on
raw materials since their inception. The demand for resources
has been increasing at a varying rate since the industrial
revolution established this country as a major producer of
fabricated goods . .~ As technology increased we found ourselves
searching for specialized resources which would enable us to
provide better quality products. The four major manganese
nodule meta~s are relied on heavily by manufacturers o£ special-
ized products. Manganese, for example, is used in the manufac-
ture of iron and steel. It is used in the smelting process to
remove sulfur and maintain the purity of the product. Nickel
is used in steel alloys requiring corrosion resistance' and high
strength. Cobalt is used in jet engine parts required to with -
stand high temperature and to make machine tools due to its
extreme hardness when alloyed. Copper is used in practically
all things electrical and in low temperature piping systems
requiring corrosion resistant properties.
Due to the specialized nature of the products in which these
minerals are used, it is not practicable to find substitutes for
these minerals. As shown in Table 1, the consumption rate of
nickel is projected to increase at a rate of 3% annually through
the turn of the century. This would increase our consumption
of nickel from a 1970 level of 311 mill ion pounds per year to
770 million pounds per year in the year 2000. Although a great
20
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TABLE 1 .
CURRENT AND PROJECTED CONSUMPTION OF MINERALS BY THE U.S.
CONSUMPTION
NICKEL (1970) 311,400,000 LBS
(2000) 770,000,000 LBS
COPPER (1970) 1,572,000 SHORT TONS
(2000) 5,400,000 SHORT TONS
COBALT (1970) 16,140,000 LBS
(2000) 24,700,000 LBS
MANGANESE (1970) 1,327,000 SHORT TONS
(2000) 2,360,000 SHORT TONS
SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR UNDER THE MINING AND
MINERALS POLICY ACT OF 1970. (P.L. 91-631), (WASHINGTON
D.C.: U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1972).
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deal-of current imports are obtained from Canada, the increased
consumption levels are expected to be met in part by imports
from newly found deposits of higher grade ore in Australia
and several other South Pacific island nations.
The annual consumption of coppper as of 1970 was 1~572~000
short tons and is expected to increase at an annual rate of 3%
also. By the year 2000 this represents a total consumption of
5,400,000 short tons of copper per year. Although lve are
practically self sufficient ln copper production, we are in-
creasing our imports due to lower grade ore in the U.S. as
compared to available imports, high labor costs and increasing
anti-pollution standards (estimated by the bureau of mines to
have increased the price of u.s. copper by 10%).1
The annual consumption of cobalt, estimated to be increasing
at an annual rate of 2.9%, was 16,190 thousand pounds in 1970
and will lncrease to 24,700 thousand pounds in the year 2000.
Although the total amount of cobalt used annually is somewhat
less than nickel and copper, it plays a very important part
in the u.s. efforts in technology. Cobalt is used in many new
alloys required to provide higher strength metals under high
temperatures and pressures. Efforts to increase production of
cobalt are complicated by the fact that cobalt is a by-product
of nickel and copper .. It is a very small percentage of these
IMinerals Yearbook, u.s. Bureau of Mines, Department of the
Interior, (Washington, 1973).
22
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deposits, the richest (found in Za~re) contain a high of 2%
cobalt and average much less.
Manganese is an essential metal to the iron and steel industry~
It is used to extract impurities from iron and steel. U.S. con-
sumption of manganese was 1,327,000 short tons in 1970 and is .
estimated to increase at a rate of 1.7% annually, resulting in
a ~onsumptionof 2,360,000 short tons by the year 2000. A
future increased availability of manganese is not expected
unless a discovery of a large deposit is made. The U.S. is
extremely dependent on this resource and it is supplied to us
from six different countries. Since South Africa and the USSR
hold 82% of the world reserves, the dependability of future
supplies is questionable.
The trend towards future increases in consumption yields
the need to obtain increased supplies. As technology continues
to increase, more advanced alloys will be required to satisfy
increasing performance parameters as strengths, temperatures
and pressures increase in advanced systems. As these alloys
are created, the current relative importance between minerals
may change to increase or decrease our dependence on foreign
sources; however, based on our best look into the future,
cobalt, manganese, nickel and copper will remain on the list
of critical minerals.
23
CHAPTER 2: PRODUCTION AND IMPORTATION
In a report by the Commander of the Air Force Systems
Command, made to the House Armed Services Committee Industrial
Preparedness Panel, General Slay addressed U.S. dependence on
foreign mineral sources. He said that "the country is more
than 50% dependent' on overseas sources for more than half of
approximately 4~ minerals described as most esSential to the
$2.3 trillion U.S. economy. Some of these raw materials corne
from highly unstable areas of the world."l Of the nine most
critical minerals, four of them may be obtained in varying
amounts by mining of manganese nodules from the deep sea bed.
The degree to which this new source is needed may best be
presented in a comparison of mineral imports versus domestic
production as a percentage of consumption.
As shown in Figure 2, the u.S. is totally dependent on
foreign supplies of cobalt and manganese. The sources of
these two minerals are various. Manganese comes from Brazil,
Gabon, South Africa and Zaire. Cobalt is received from Zaire,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, Canada and Norway. Of these
sources, 53% of the world's manganese and 52% of the world's
cobalt come from states in southern Africa. This emphasizes
the question of reliability of resources.
lClarence A. Robinson, "Defense Science Board Urges Multi-Year
Contracts." Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 1, 1980,
pp. 130 -133.
24
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FIGURE 2
U.S. NET IMPORT RELIANCE OF SELECTED l--lINERALS AND METALS
AS A PERCENT OF CONSUMPTION IN 1977
MINERALS AND
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SOURCE: AMOS A. JORDAN AND ROBERT A. KIL~~RX, STRATEGIC MINERAL
DEPENDENCE: THE STOCKPILE DILE~Th~. THE WASHINGTON PAPERS
VOL VII, NO . 70, (BEVERLY HILLS AND LONDON: SAGE PUBLICATIONS,
1979), pp. 21-22.
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--The U.S. has historically been self sufficient in copper
resources. As shown in Table 2, we are projecting a much
greater usage than we will be able to supply. This is due
primarily to escalating production costs in the U.S. As a
result, we will be importing 65% of our copper in 1985 and
55% in the year 2000. This represents 3,990,000 short tons
in 1985 and 3,020,000 short tons in 2000. We are currently
relying on Canada, Peru and Chile for the small amount of
copper which we import. As our consumption grows we will be
able to make up the majority of the difference with the neigh-
bars in this hemisphere, but·an increasing amount will have to
come from other sources.
Nickel is available in U.S. deposits also but our available
reserves are quite small. We imported 90% of our consumption
of this mineral in 1970, project an importation of 87% in 1985
and 88% In the year 2000. Our primary sources of nickel are
Canada and Norway. As our imports increase we can expect to
receive greater quantities from southern Africa and the South
Pacific islands. The increases represent a yearly import.of
680,600,000 pounds of nickel by the year 2000.
27
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TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF U.S. DEMAND WITH U.S. PRODUCTION 1970, 1985, 2000
(UNITS IN THOUSANDS)
1970 1985 2000
DEMfu~D/PRODUCTION DEMAND/PRODUCTION DE~l~ND/PRODUCTION
COBALT 16,190 LBS/O 20,000 LBS/O 24,200 LBS/O
COPPER 1,572 ST/1,720 ST 2,900 ST/1,910 ST 5,400 ST/2,380 ST
MANGANESE 1,372 ST/66 ST 1,770 ST/O ST 2,360 ST/O ST
NICKEL 311,400 LB/30,600 LB 492,200 LB/60,000 LB 770,000 LB/84,900 LE
DATA FROM U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR UNDER THE MINING AND MINERALS
POLICY ACT OF 1970, (P.L. 91-631), (WASHINGTON D.C.: U.S.
G~VERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1972).
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"PART III
DEEP SEA BED
MINING
OF
Mfu~Gk~ESE NODULES
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CHAPTER 1: FEASIBILITY
The technology exists to "harvest" manganese nodules from
the deep sea bed. Using one of several designs, a deep sea
mining vessel can obtain manganese nodules from 15,000 foot
depths and deposit this "catch" on a cargo vessel for trans-
portation to, and processing at, a shore based refining/proces-
sing facility. The technology is here and lacks only the
capital to proceed to the operational phase of the venture.
The economic aspect of the mining operation is, however,
much more complicated. Of three major factors involved in the
economics of this project, the first, the fact that the majority
of the expense of this project lies in the land based operations,
is not generally recognized. The processing of the nodules is
a detailed and costly undertaking. One company intends to
refine all four of the major minerals but most are interested
in refining only nickel, cobalt and copper. The recovery of 1
to 3 million short dry tons/year is claimed to be necessary to
turn a profit. While operating costs vary from $18-$75/ton of
nodules, and the sale of the final products are estimated at
$65-$75 per ton, yielding ~rofits varying from nil to $47-$57
per ton before taxes. Since the range of operating costs varies
so drastically, it can only be assumed that certainties in these
estimates are not enjoyed by the mining enterprises.
A second major economic impact is the influence that forces
outside of the industry have on their profitability. These
30
/forces will have a direct impact on the future of deep sea bed
mining. Primarily, the current deterrents to the industry
are the third world nations demanding a share in the "common
heritage of mankind." Until debate on this subject is com-
pleted in the U.N. or the U.S. decides to go its own way, the
industry is at a standstill until the decisions are made to:
establish the economic rent which must be paid to international
authorities, the future prices at which the nodules will be sold,
and how the ocean mines are restricted in competition with land
based mining.
The third major economic factor which will impact the
operation is that of financing. Since the immense capital
C05t~ (shown in Tables 3 and 4) cannot be met by the mining
companies/consortia themselves, loans from banks must be
obtained. Due to the many legal complications associated
with deep sea bed mining, banks are reluctant to approve the
necessary loans. "Thomas C. Houseman, a vice-president of
Chase Manhattan Bank, in testimony before a Senate subcommittee,
made his posi tion very clear: 'In view of the demonstrated
desire of the international community to establish control over
such an activity, the present absence of political sponsorship
and security of tenure constitute an unacceptable business
risk to a financial institution.'
The inability of mining companies to obtain the necessary
loans ... effectively stops them from moving ahead ... It is
possible for the U.S. government to provide mining companies
31
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TABLE 3
OCEAN MINING COST ESTI~~TES (1975) (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
EXPLORATION AND R&D
CAPITAL COSTS
TOTAL INVESTMENTS
WORKING CAPITAL
ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS
LOW
75
385
460
40
120
MEDIUM
125
468
593
45
143
HIGH
150
550
700
50
165
SOURCE: REBECCA L. WRIGHT, "OCEAN MINING: AN ECONOMIC EVALUA-
TION." OCEAN MINING ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR, MAY 1976, p. 11.
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"TABLE 4
ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL COSTS: $493 MILLION
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
MINING SECTOR TRANSPORT SECTOR PROCESSING SECTOR
POWER PLANT. 7
NAVIGATION . 5
96
PLATFO&~ . .. . S4
PIPE HANDLING..., 21
LIFT 9
SECTOR COSTS . . 55 EQUIPMENT .
· · ·
199
UTILITIES
· · ·
84
SITE. . . .
· · ·
20
BUILDINGS 20
WASTE DISPOSAL.
·
19
55 342
TOTAL CAPITAL COSTS
SOURCE: J. D. NYHART, LANCE ANTRIM, ARTHUR E. CAPSTAFF, ALLISON
D. KOHLER, DOYLE LESHAW, "A COST MODEL OF DEEP OCEAN MINING
AND ASSOCIATED REGULATORY ISSUES." MIT SEA GRANT REPORT,
(MITSG 78-4), MARCH 1, 1978, p. ES4.
33
493
with investment guarantees, thereby eliminating the risk
involved to the companies and banks. Houseman stated that,
were the companies to receive investment guarantees in legis-
lation, financial support from the banks ~ould be forthcoming."l
Most recently, the Reagan administration appears to be bent
on pushing deep sea bed mining through the U.N. in a way which
is fair and equitable to those companies that have invested so
heavily thus far. As the political turmoil is what it is, this
study is necessarily limited to the impact of deep sea bed ffilnlng
given no unforeseen depletions of currently planned revenues.
lJack N. Barkenbus, Deep Sea Bed Resources~ Politics and
Technology. (New York: The Free Press, 1979), p. 22.
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CHAPTER 2: CAPABILITY
Manganese nodules provide the opportunity of reducing
foreign imports drastically given the proper political and
economic framework. The total possible .i mp a c t has to be
measured in several different areas: (1) ocean resources;
(2) available concentrations; and (3) annual harvest per mine
site.
To consider the available resources we must consider that
mining companies have defined acceptable nodules as those
containing at least 1.24% nickel, 1.03% copper, 0.24% cobalt
and 24% manganese. With this in mind, it is currently esti-
mated that the world's oceans contain 2100 million tons of
manganese nodules. As shown in Table 5, the processed amount
of minerals equate to an estimated 88% of the world demand
for nickel, 7% of the world demand for copper, 367% of world
demand for cobalt and 127% of world demand for manganese.
The existing concentrations of nodules available for
mining operations vary with each company's surveyors. The
various estimates represent a low of 4 available sites to a
high of 185. The large variation is due to the varied def-
initions of "sure" sites and "possible" sites.
Based on previous determined economic models, a single
mining operation is expected to harvest 3 million tons annually.
This would result in a yield of 42,000 tons of nickel, 37,000
tons of copper, 4,000 tons of cobalt and 750,000 tons of
35
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TABLE 5
POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF OCEAN RESOURCES
LOW MED HIGH
RATIO OF RESOURCES TO
CUMULATIVE WORLD DEMAND
1976-2000 ·
TOTAL SEA BED
RESOURCES
(MILLIONS OF TONS)
NODULES 2100
NICKEL 26.0
COPPER 22.5
COBALT 5.0
MANGANESE 504.0
1. 00
0.08
4.39
1.34
0.88
0.07
3.67
1.27
0.82
0.06
3.28
1.10
SOURCE: JUDITH KILDOW, ED., DEEPSEA MINING. (Cfu~BRIDGE AND
LONDON: MIT PRESS, 1980), p. 101.
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manganese per year. Based on 1975 levels, this equates to
5% of ~orld production of nickel, 0.5-1% of copper, 12% of
cobalt and 7% of manganese.
Given then, that production capabilities are both available
and significant, we can see that the projected levels of imports
in 1985 can be reduced. As shown in Table 6, the U.S. can
theoretically satisfy 100% of its projected 1985 import levels
in nickel; cobalt and manganese and 18% of its copper imports
by employing 5 deep sea mining vessels. This would be a sig-
nificant step forward in our battle to gain self sufficiency
in minerals.
37
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TABLE 6 -
COMPARISON OF EXPECTED LEVEL OF IMPORTS (1985) l\ITH POSSIBLE
PRODUCTION LEVEL OF 5 DEEP SEA MINING SITES.
IMPORT 5 MINE % OF
REQUIREMENTS (1985) SITES IMPORTS
NICKEL 432,200,000 LBS 420,000,000 LBS 97
COBALT 20,000,000 LBS 40,000,000 LBS 200
MANGANESE 1,770,000 TONS ' 3 , 750 , 000 TONS 211
COPPER 1,000,000 TONS 185,000 TONS 18
38
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PART IV
NATIONAL SECURITY
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CHAPTER 1: ~~TERIALS VULNERABILITY
In . the 1973-74 time frame, conflicts in the Middle East
prompted the initial oil embargo imposed by OPEC. This resulted
in skyrocketing prices in the petroleum industry. This was the
initial tremor of the third world's drive for a new world
economic order. Shortly thereafter, the International Bauxite
Association was formed and bauxite taxes were raised from
$1.80/tonto $lS/ton resulting in a. doubling of the price of
delivered bauxite. Following these leads, mineral producer
associations were formed in copper, tungsten, mercury and iron
ore, and less developed countries began. urging changes in the
marketing structure of metals.
As a result of these activities, there has been an increased
interest in the efforts put forth by the U.s. government to
counter these moves and provide safeguards which will minimize
the effect of future unified actions by significant mineral
producers in the third world. Proposed solutions have varied
from increasing efforts in mineral production technology, re-
vising stockpile philosophies, to improving mineral management.
The U.S. is dependent on imports for many of its industri-
ally used minerals. A representative sample of various imports
are shown in Figure 3. An unscheduled cutoff of minerals could
seriously damage our ability to produce affected goods and re-
quire the use of substitutes to produce lower quality goods
(where that option would be found acceptable).
40
If additional
,J -,
d.epos i, ts of a desired mineral could be found, mining operations,
once initiated, could be expected to commence in a short esti-
mate of five years, but normally ten years.
A more effective use of unilateral action lVould result in
a joint cartel action (increasing prices and reducing output)
similar to the OPEC strategy. In addition to achieving a
greater monetary return and conservation of limited resources,
a clever manipulator can also control the amount of a specific
mineral used by a consumer in need of a non-substitutable re-
source. This in effect would result in exterior control of a
nation's industrial capabilities (at least in those areas
requiring that specific mineral) .
As previously discussed, manganese nodule metals represent
four of the nine critical minerals which we are most dependent
upon outside sources for supply at this time or in the foreseeable
future. While we import all of our manganese, 53% of the world's
reserves are in Southern Africa, and 82% is held by two countries,
the USSR and South Africa, neither of which can be counted on for
a continuous supply in the future. We also import all of our
cobalt and 52% of the world's cobalt is produced in Southern
Africa, primarily Zaire and Zambia. While sources for nickel
and copper are less critical, we still import 74% and 18%
(respectively) of these minerals. Although their current
sources are reliable, we expect to double our consumption by
tIle year 2000 and the projected sources of these minerals are
South Pacific islands, Australia and Southern Africa.
41
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FIGURE 3
NET IMPORT OF SELECTED MINERALS AND METALS
(% CONSUMPTION, 1979)
~IINERALS &
~IETALS
MAJOR SOURCES
CANADA, ISRAEL
CANADA, SWITZERLAND, U.S.S.~.
CANADA, MEXICO, HONDURAS
JAMAICA, AUSTRALIA, SURINAM,
GUINEA
ZAIRE, BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG~
ZAMBIA., FINLAND
S. AFRICA, U.S.S.R., U.K.
S. AFRICA, U.S.S.R., TURKEY,
ZIMBABWE (RHODESIA)
CANADA, S. AFRICA
MALAYSIA, THAILAND, BOLIVIA~
.INDONESIA
MEXICO, SPAIN, ITALY, S. AFRICA
CANADA, NORWAY, NEW CALEDONIA,
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
10075
-------i~
____to
BRAZIL, THAILAND, CANADA
r--.--------\ INDIA, BRAZIL, MALAGASY
~--------~l MEXICO, SPAIN
~--------------~l BRAZIL, GABON, S. AFRICA
THAILAND, CANADA, MALAYSIA
a 25 50
COLUMBIUM .r
MICA(SHEET) I
STRONTIUM I
MANGANESE I
TANTALUM I
COBALT
PLATINUM 1
(GROUP METALS)
BAUXITE &
ALUMINA
CHROMIUM
ASBESTOS I
TDJ \
FLUORINE 1
NICKEL ~
POTASSIUM
GOLD
ZINC
MINERALS &
METALS
TUNGSTEN
CADMIUM
IRON ORE
a 25 50 75
-,
100
MAJOR SOURCES
CANADA, BOLIVIA, KOREA
CANADA, AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM-
LUXEMBOURG
Cfu~ADA, VENEZUELA, BRAZIL
LIBERIA
SOURCE: CLARENCE A. ROBINSON, "DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD URGES MULTI-
YEAR CONTACTS," AVIATION WEEK &SPACE TECHNOLOGY, (DECEMBER
1, 1980), p. 133.
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As our need for future sources of these minerals becomes
more obvious, we seem to be inexorably drawn to the southern
countries of Africa. As sho~n in Figure 4, it is easy to see
that the vast material resources of the area are immense. Their
reliability as a future supplier is not totally dependable.
Frequent coups and revolutions can easily change national
policies and several countries in the area have already aligned
themselves . with communist countries.
The four minerals being considered by this study are
inextrically tied to national security. The Department of
Defense depends on the industrial manufacture of arms and
munitions. Whether used as repair parts or replacements/ad-
ditions to existing forces, the production of defense related
hardware is necessary to maintain current force levels and an
increased output will be required during times of conflict.
Manganese, used in the purification of iron and steel, is an
essential element in this manufacturing process. Cobalt (as
shown in Figure 5) used in high strength/high temperature alloys
is an essential element in the manufacture of jet engine parts.
Copper and nickel are jointly used in the manufacture of piping
and conductors and are both used widely in the civilian com-
munity as well as the military. If the flow of these four
minerals into the u.s. could be adequately controlled, the
security of the country could be severely threatened.
44
RESOURCES:~II NERAL . _-\FRICASOUTH ER\
'-/'----- - - -
/
I
i}
- .. ~ . ' . . -: - ~
-,- . ' , ; .- .
- ~ ...
- -0
CHRO:'II U~l
- . 'IO',lDSDl.--\i'. ~,
ZAIRE
COBALT \ _COPPER
DIAMONDS
TIN n _
COLUMBIUA
TANTAL L':·I
GOLD _
TUNGSTE\
45
I
I
..../
! ,
,
\
•
/
/
I
- Z .A.Ma! A //
COBALT /'
GOLD ./
~Ll\NG~ -
(
~~~'" ._ -- I
.... .-I -
Z 1M 8:-\ 8 \'., E
CHROMIU~·l
NICKEL
COPPER
GOLD
ASBESTOS
E ,.- ~ , ~.-/ L.J..- - - .. ~ ;"
- ' ~ -
.....
....
-,
FI GURE 5
ST RATEGI C ~IE T.-\L S I ;~ JET E:-':G I~ES
CHRO~IIU~1
COBALT
COLU~1BIUM
CHRO~IIU~1
COBALT
TUNGSTEN
CHRO~IIUM
COBALT
COLUMBIUM
TUNGSTEN
TA:';TALUM
FIGURE 5
46
....
,
/ -,
CHAPTER 2: ECO?'-IOMIC STOCKPILING
In an effort to protect our country from a shortage of
minerals during wartime, Congress (in 1946) provided for the
stockpiling of strategic minerals which would ensure a supply
adequate to provide an efficient transition to the i\artime
production levels of our industries. This is based on the
estimated needs of the military to support an armed conflict
of a conventional scale for a specified period of time varying
from 1 to 3 years.
Recently the administration has directed that studies are
to be undertaken to determine the need for economic stockpiles.
These are proposed as a hedge against unified or cartel action
in the various areas of mineral production. The idea is based
on the assumption that, given enough reserve supplies on hand,
the miheral users could survive longer (with the same produc-
tion levels) than the cartel could afford to hold back produc-
tion. This idea has many supporters and opponents.
Those opposing the idea point out that the only sure ivay
to avoid devastating cartel actions is to locate other avialable
resources, chiefly in the unsurveyed reaches of the United States.
If this is an unfruitful attempt then other more reliable sources
must be found and developed. The proponents of the stockpile
point out that the tapping of a new source is an extremely long
le ad time operation and that at least the stockpile could be
built up over a shorter period and provide a much closer re-
source.
47
The concept of maintaining economic stockpiles seems to be
a good idea in theory. The use of economic stockpiles could
turn the world into a chess board with minerals as the pieces
in the strategic positioning of the ever shrinking reserves of
non-fuel minerals.
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CR~PTER 3: DEEP SEA BED MINING: ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE
While stockpiles are an obvious defense against carteliza-
tion or embargoes, they tend to offer many vulnerabilities.
Should economic stockpiles be drawn on whenever there is a
shortage in supplies or rise in prices? If so, at what point
do we start drawing on them? Once they have been reduced, are
they not then vulnerable to the supplier's actions? Will ques-
tions of this sort generate desire for another stockpile to
protect the economic stockpile? These are not simple questions.
Deep sea bed mining provides a partial solution to the need
for national economic stockpiles. Although many mineral needs
are being considered for the economic stockpile, manganese
nodule mining offers an alternative to costly surplus stores
of nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese.
The mere concept of developing machinery capable of retrieving
these nodules has reduced the threat of market price increases.
A great deal of the success of these ventures is based on a
minimum price for the final product. If a cartel was to in-
crease prices, the economic feasibility of each deep sea mining
site would increase, thus increasing the competition of produc-
tion. As previously seen, the capability of deep sea production
to provide these safeguards is significant due to its potential
to supply a high percentage of u.S. consumption in nickel, cobalt
and manganese. Due to the lower percentage supplied of copper,
the protection against price hikes is not as significant.
49
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SU?vlMARY
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SU?-.fMARY
The U.S. enjoys the luxury of being more self sufficient
ln mineral resources than most other highly developed, highly
industrialized countries. We are however becoming increasingly
dependent on foreign suppliers for critital materials needed by
industry to satisfy our military requirements.
Although these difficulties are not foreseen as the source
of armed conflict in the future, it must be assumed that restric.-
tions in minerals supplies may at the minimum produce considerable
international frictions. Any means available to reduce our de-
pendence on critical materials must be carefully considered in
an effort to curtail the effects of reduction in these critical
supplies.
A very real option is, unquestionably, the exploitation of
manganese nodule resources. This choice offers protections
against price increases, embargoes and cartel action \\hich may
be initiated in nickel, cobalt, copper and manganese markets.
The economic feasibility of this venture grows as minerals
become scarce or prices start to rise. It offers a protection
to industry, the military and enhances national security. The
benefits are many and need to be carefully reviewed by policy
makers.
While we are anticipating the outcome of the current Law
of the Sea negotiations, we must bear in mind that there are
many topics to be discussed and agreed upon. Ocean mining is
52
only one facet of these negotiations. Regardless of the economic
and se~urity benefits, they must be considered in light of the
other available benefits which are being negotiated for in this
convention. Too little flexibility in anyone area can compro-
mise desired outcomes in. others. We must strive for the most
advantageous position in all facets of UNCLOS realizing that
reorientation of policy may be required to arrive at the best
possible results.
53
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The lands and waters of the coastal zone have either
been mismanaged or not managed at all since the early set-
tling of the United states. Though initial settlements
were formed on coastal sites, the early settlers found that
these sites were especially subject to natural hazards
and they soon abandoned them for more hospitable, inland
areas. The coastal shorelands and islands were not exten-
sively resettled until the late nineteenth century. Then,
since the turn of the century, the trend from coastal
development toward inland was reversed and the coastal
zone is now experiencing population pressures which threat-
en the future viability of many sections. 1 Nowhere is
this more evident, perhaps, than along the nation's bar-
rier beaches. Rhode Island, while not suffering nearly
from the degree of development on its barrier beaches
as other states, is no exception. Econ omi c pressures
brought to bear have forced federal, state, and local
governments to grapple extensively with this issue.
On October 21, 1981, then Secretary of the Interior
James Watt, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on
Environmental Pollution, issued a statement as to the
importance of the nation's barrier beaches. The following
is an excerpt from that statement:
-1-
"While it is extremely difficult to gener-
alize about the natural resources of coastal
barriers and adjacent waters, there is no
question that these habitats contribute
large numbers of fish and wildlife resour-
ces, which are used and enjoyed by many.,,2
Their unique ability to serve as a buffer between storm
surges and landward habitat as well as their integral role
in an ecosystem which provides habitat and breeding areas
for an abundance of living resources which are dependent
on the area makes them a valuable resource to both the
surrounding community and ecosystem. Although possessed
with an inherent ability to adapt to the forces of nature,
they are not nearly so flexible with the intrusion of man
and the pressures of development.
The need for the preservation of barrier beaches in
their natural state cannot be overstated and is recognized
by all levels of government. Although each level of gov-
ernment has shown concern over the coastal zone and govern-
ment regulation and intent in protecting barrier beaches is
clearly evident, the seeming lack of coordination between
the various levels of government has produced a nebulous
situation which in the past has not only failed to protect
barrier beaches in many cases but actually promoted devel-
opment on these fragile resources. However, the picture
appears brighter with the advent of recent federal legisla-
tion that seems to indicate a new willingness on the part
of the federal government to effectively limit development
-2-
in these areas by eliminating federal construction and
flood insurance subsidies. This recent legislation has
the potential to act as the leading catalyst for an ef-
fective barrier beach management program.
This paper will examine the results of federal, state,
and local legislation and regulations on the development
of Green Hill Beach in South Kingstown, Rhode Island and,
from conclusions drawn from that case history, assess the
future of the extensive network of barrier beaches (see
figure 1)3 within the State of Rhode Island.
-3-
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CHAPTER 2
THE HTPORTANCE OF BARR IER BEACHES AND
THEIR I MP ORTANCE IN THE RHODE ISLAND COASTAL ECOSYSTEM
Barrier b eaches are narr ow strips of land mad e of
uncons olidat ed material e x t en d i n g roughly parallel to the
gen e ral coastal trend and s e parated from the mainland by
a r elatively n arrow body of fresh, brackish, or s a l t wa te r ,
4or a wetland. Th eir importance as part of a n d to the
surrounding ecosystem can not be overemphasized. Al t h ough
fragile, barrier beaches s erve as the primary buffer be-
twe en st orm s u r ges and th e l andward habitat. Th e role of
r educing the open s ea ene r g ie s s o that the l andward e n -
vironment may persist is a critical e le men t in the scien-
tific definition of a coastal barrier and one of the bar-
riers most important functions. 5 Barrier beaches, wh i l e
fragil e a n d vulnerable to s t or m damage thems elves, a ct as
s t or m buffers. Th ey a bs or b a n d dissipate the destructiv e
e ner g y of s t or m driven waves, thereby protecting the sal t
ponds, marshes, and l ow-lying mainland b eyond them. 6
Their ability to perform this function, however, i s dir-
e c t l y tied to their fr eedom to shift a n d migrate with
currents a n d develop those f eature s common t o barrier
beaches. A complex interaction of natural forc e s a n d
conditions control the position a n d form of coastal bar-
riers. Th e action of the wind, waves, and tides on the
bar r ie r s unconsolidat ed s ediments caus es e r os ion or
-5-
accretion of the seaward margin, thus resulting in chan-
ge s in size, shape, and location.?
Coupled with this erosion process in the physical
determination of the barrier beach is the ever-increa-
sing s e a level. Measurements made in Newport since 1930
s h ow that relative sea level is gradually rising in this
region at an average r ate of 0.0096 feet per year or about
one foot every century; due to a rough slope of Rhod e
Island south shore beaches of 1:30 to 12 feet above s ea
l evel, this equates to a horizontal encroachment of 50-60
8feet per century. Figure ~ illustrate s the e f f e c t of
erosion and the relative rise in sea level on Green Hi ll
Barrier Beach. This change in sea level has increased
the threat of coastal flooding a n d contributes signifi-
cantly to the migration of barrier beaches in this region
landward.
Despite the complex interactions involving wave ac-
tion, sand distribution, nearshore currents, and rises in
sea level, the barrier b each has shown a remarkable ability
to adapt to the dynamics of nature and retain the i n tegrity
of its storm protection features.
However, these natural process es must r emain unin-
t errupted in order for the barrier beach to act as a storm
buffer. Left alone, coastal barriers adapt by changing
s h a pe and moving landward w Th ey move up the coastal plain
to remain above sea level - always managing to r etain the
-6-
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inte grity of their e cos ys te ms in spite of the of ten t ot a l
r earrang e ment of their par t icle c ompone n ts . 9
Al t h ou gh e x t re me l y a da ptab le to the dynamics of na t ure,
barrier b e ache s do n ot far e as well to the intrus i on of
man and development. Figure 3 illustrat e s the definable
f eatures of a well developed bar r ier b each. 10 Mos t notice-
a ble i s the existence of a distinct dune r e gion. For med
by the a c cu mu lat i on of sand blown of f the be ach f ace,
the s e dune s a re e x t re mel y vulnerable to wind a n d wa v e
a c t i on . Wi n d b orne sand a c cu mu l ate s r apidly a r oun d se mi -
pe r meable ob je c ts , a n d this make s be a chgra s s very e f f e c -
tive in building a n d s tab i liz i ng dunes. Mos t of Rh ode
Island's barrier b eaches s u ppor t only on e dune line that,
in its natural s tate , i s well v e getat e d with b eachgra s s
a n d a f ew shr u bs . 11 Th e inability of this b e a chgra s s t o
develop or ma i n ta i n itself i s the maj or factor in incre as e d
wi n d e r os ion and r esults in a "blowout" - a smal l tra il-
like f eature s t re tch i ng a l ong the b each s i de of the du ne . 12
Fai l u re of the be a ch gra s s to recoloniz e will r esult in a
de epening a nd widening of the " blowout". These "bl. ow-
out s" a re often u s ed as f ootpaths a n d a l t hough be a chgra s s
i s a n ex t raor d i n a r i l y hardy a n d well a dapte d plant, it wi l l
not tolerate tra mpling. 13 The end r esult i s a severe de-
gree of e ros ion a lon g this portion of the dune .
S i mi lar to the e f fe c t s of wind e r os i on but u sually
more pronounced i s wave e r os ion . Here, wave ac t ion cuts a
-8-
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deeper and wider path than seen in a "blow out" and r educ es
the l evel of the dune to t hat of the beach. This i s r e-
f erred to as a "washout". 14 Again, inability of the
beachgrass to recolonize will re sult in a wors ening of the
problem and ultimately l es s en or n egate the a b i l i ty of t he
dune t o prote ct t he backshore area fr om wave act i on during
a s t or m.
The a b i l i t y of the bar r ie r beaches to withstand the
f orces of the oc ean is determined by the height and sta-
bility of the dune . To build dune s and protect them, th e
beachgras s must be pro t e cte d , a nd t h is means controlling
c onstruction and vehicular and hu man traffic. Figure 4
illustrates the negative effe ct that construction and
vehicular a nd human t raf f ic has had on the dune vegeta-
tion on Green Hill Barrier Beach.
RELATIONSHIP TO THE SURROUNDING ECOSYS TEM
Coas tal barriers provi de natural r esources of s ign i -
ficant value to s ociety . They create and nurture estu-
a r i es and wetlands which nurture fin fi sh and shell fi s h
s to cks vital to our nation' s commercial and r ecreational
f ishi ng interests. 15
The barrier beach, the marsh, a nd the coastal pond
are one ecosys tem . The complex relations hips within this
ecosys tem di ctat e that a change t o one of the elements of
-10-
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the system may produce a change throughout the whole s ys-
t em. 16 Figure q illustrates the geographic proximity in
th e Green Hill Beach ar ea of the s e elements. The s alt
mar sh and coastal pond, unlike the barrier beaches, are
rich in plant and an i mal life; but, s imi lar to the barrier
beaches , ext r e me ly s ensitive to t he intrusion of man and
development. An a pparent ly s mall change in runoff of
fresh water t o the pond or marsh as a r esult of increas ed
draina ge from develo pment or the introduction of increa s e d
a mounts of s ea water or sand r esulting fr om a poorly de -
veloped dune can r a di cally a f fe ct an i mal and plant pop-
ulations. 17
The Sal t rljarsh
Sal t marshes are low, flat areas that are regularl y
fl ooded by tidal proce ss es and are found extens i ve ly in
s ever a l of Rhode Island' s sal t pond s. The mixing of f r e s h
and sal t water caus ed by this tidal mix i ng produce s r apid
oxygen and nutruent c i r culat ion and "cleans es" the sys tem
within the marsh, causing the s a l t marsh to rival the bio-
logical productivity of that found in int ensive a gr i cul t u -
r al areas . Sal t marshes have fr equently been des cr i bed
as "food f act ories" f or the an i mals that live in c oa stal
wat er s . 18
Altho ugh biologically a ct i ve , sal t marshes a l s o per f or m
-12-
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another valuable role within the barrier beach and coastal
zone ecosystem. Their ability to absorb large quantities
of water which would otherwise flood the mainland during
a storm can not be discounted. 19
Despite the obvious value that salt marshes play within
the state of Rhode Island, only about 4000 acres remain. 20
Like the barrier beach, the salt marsh is also on the
critical list. Recent abuses caused by development, ex-
cavation, and filling have reduced their numbers signi-
ficantly.
Coastal Ponds
Wi t h out the barrier beaches, there would be no s alt
ponds (see figure 5). Like the salt marshes, coastal
ponds are also biologically productive areas. A salt pond
is particularly vulnerable to man because he can so easily
alter its controlling parameters. The parameters that
govern the characteristics of a salt pond are summarized
below:
I. Characteristics of flow: Volume and var-
iation of fresh and salt water flows into
the pond; circulation patterns; turbulence;
flushing time (the rate at which pond wa-
ter is replaced by new fresh and salt water).
II. Water properties: Salinity, temperature,
transparency, nutrients, pollutants and
dissolved oxygen.
III. The Form of the Pond: Shape, size, a~~ to-
pographyand character of the bottom.
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It is the modification of the quality and change in mix-
ture of the fr esh a n d s alt water in the pond that has the
gr e a t e s t effect on the salt pond. An incre ased flow of
s eawater and the r esultant increa se in sal i n i t y has the
potential to de stroy the delicately balanc ed environment
within the marsh. Also , a n incre as ed fl ow of s e awater wi l l
h ave the t endency t o bring in a dd i t i onal a moun t s of s and
whi ch is then deposited in the pond, thereby r educing its
s i ze over time. In addition to the n egative e f fec t s that
development has on the barrier be aches and dunes that r e-
suIt in the opening of n ew bre achways, the introduction of
r e sidential s e ptic s ys te ms has a l s o impacted the en t i re
ec osy s t e m.
The number of h ous es on the barriers and a rou n d
many of Rh od e Island' s sal t p onds is incre a sing
a n d the great majority of thes e h ous es have
their own s eptic systems. No data a r e presen t -
ly available on the effects u p on sal t ponds of
l eachings from s eptic systems, but s t u d i es made
in similar en v i r on men t s elsewhere . • • suggest
that incre a sing the number of l each fields
aroun~2a pond will a dver se l y affect the en v i r on -
ment.
ST ORM HISTORY OF RHO DE I SLAND' S BARRIER BEACHES
Ba r r ie r b e aches, in their natural stat e, se r ve a s
t he fir st line of defens e a gainst major storms a n d hur-
ricanes by protecting the backshore a rea a ga i ns t s t or m
s u rge . Rhode I sland h as been threatened by 71 hurri canes
s i n ce 1635 of which 13 caus ed s evere tidal floodin g, 25
-15-
caused moderate flo oding, a n d 38 caus ed scares with little
or no flo oding . 2 3 Wh i le it i s difficult to a scertain the
da mag e t o local communities in most cases, the hurrican es
of 1938 a n d 1954 provide s ome indication of the dama g e
incurred. By 1938, extens i ve development had t aken pla c e
on the s outh s h ore beaches. Wi t h a few i solated e x ce pt i ons ,
the hurricane s we pt all s t r u c t u res of f a l l the barrier
b eache s in the state. Many of thes e a reas were a gai n
built up when in 1954 a n ot her hurricane swept them clean
f or a se con d time. 2 4 Th e Pr ov i d en c e Journal Compa ny pub-
lished in "Hurricane Car ol Lashe s Rh ode Island ll the f ol-
lowing statistics: 2 5
Date of Hu r r i can e
1938
1954
Pro pe r t y Da mage
.': 10 0 , 0 00 , 00 0
~;2 00,000,000
Deaths
3 17
19
In a re port to Con gr e ss the Secretary of the Ar my on
Apr i l 15, 1977 s tat e d that the occurence a t that time of
a s t or m e qu i va len t to that of the 1938 or 1954 hurrica n e s
wou l d r e sult in losses of ab out $ 10 4- 108 million. Th e r e-
por t speaks of projects under c onstruction t o r e duc e t h e
poten t ial flood damage t o the area a n d c onclude s that t h e
Se cre tar y of the Ar my d oe s not r ecommend a n d f u r t her f ed-
eral e xpans i on of funds f or fl ood pr otect i on in the a rea .
He s ugges t s inste ad that a number of local me a sures b e
-16-
adopt ed to r educe possible losses from flooding. Inclu-
ded among these local measures are hurricane warning and
e me r ge n cy flood mobilization measures, flood plain zoning
r egulations, and flood proofing during construction. 26
Man- ma de methods design ed to r educe t he effects of
s t or m damage have pr oven to be e con omi cal l y impractical.
In the long run, l and us e control and coastal zone manage-
ment are much more effe ctive. I mproper us e of fl ood prone
l ands s u ch a s barrier beache s , as proven by the 1938 and
1954 hurricanes, only r esults in unneces s ary loss es of
human life, property, and seve re s ocial disr upt i on . 27
-17-
CHAPTER 3
DEVELOP~ffiNT ON RHODE ISLAND'S
BARRIER BEACHES
The barrier beach ecosystem is remarkably adaptable
to the vagaries of nature but extremely sensitive to t h e
intrusion of man and development. Th e dune which is so
important to the barrier beach and which gives it the a -
bility to withstand storm surge and buffer the backshore
from this storm activity has been a f avorit e spot of d e v -
e l oper s for the location of residential dwellings due to
the improved vie w that the dune affords.
Before World Wa r II, approximately 90% of coastal
barrier real estate was undevel oped and l argely inac c es-
si.ble to the public. In the years immediately following
the war, the rat e of s e c on d home development on coastal
barriers escalated in response to increasing affluence,
mobility, and available leisure time. The trend wa s e s -
pecially rapid in the Northeast where numerous coastal
barriers lie within a f ew hours drive of maj or popula-
28tion centers.
In an e f f or t to reduce the impact of his devel opment,
man has further compounded the problem with construction
of " stabilization proj ects" such as jetties, groins, a n d
breakwaters; thereby further altering the natural course
of e v e n t s . Th e respons e of this stressed e nv i r on men t will
va r y in proportion to its capacity for absorbing this s t ress .
-18-
The barrier consists of at least five distinct but inte-
grated environments including the beach, dune field, back
dune flat, marsh, and barrier pond. Each of these varies
in the amount of natural stress to which it is exposed and
in the amount of additional human stress which it can
sustain. 29
Despite present knowledge and past experience, the
attractiveness of barrier beaches has tempted many people
to ignore the- dangers associated with living on them and,
in some cases, these people do not realize the hazards
involved.
Rhode Island's barrier beaches have been subject to
increasing developmental pressures. Increasing numbers of
commercial, recreational, and residential structures are
being built, many on the dune. A developmental pattern
common before the state's low lying beaches were swept
clean by the 1938 and 1954 hurricanes is once again estab-
lishing itself. 3D Reasons for this resurgence in devel-
opment included the lack of a coordinated federal and
state effort to regulate development, insufficient zoning
regulation at the local level, and the tenacity displayed
by the public in their willingness to assume the risks of
living on the barrier beach.
FEDERAL ENCOURA GE MENT OF BARRIER BEACH DEVELOPMENT
Over the past two decades, much of the development
-19-
on coastal barriers has b een underwritten by the Amer ican
t axpayer. 3 1 Not only h a s the f ederal g over n men t , through
improved road s ys te ms increas ed acce s sibility to the s e a r eas ,
but they have a ls o provided federal s u b s i d ie s f or construc-
tion of bridges a nd utilitie s on the b a r r ier beaches with
adopt i on of the Na t ional Flood Insurance Program a n d h ave
subsidized to a l arg e de gre e the c onstruction of private
dwel l i n g s .
Fe de ral ass istance , dire ct a nd indire ct,
c omes in many forms. Direct exp en d i t ures
include grant s f or highway a n d bridge c on-
s t r u c t ion , ass is t a nce in providing water
s u pp l y a n d sewer s ys te ms , a n d proj e c t s t o
s tab i l i ze coa s t al bar r ie r s . Ind irect as -
sistance includes f e deral flood insurance
or l oan guarantees f or h ome c onstruction. 32
The liabilities of the f e deral g ove r nmen t in c oa stal b a r r i e r s
i s s igni f ica n t . Not including fl ood insurance, the f eder al
gov e r n men t h a s spent at l east $8 00 million s i n ce fi s cal
y e ar 1975 to ass i s t private c ons t r uct i on on c oa stal ba~-
riers. In addition, the Fe deral Emergency Ma nage men t Age n cy
est i mates tha t t he f ederal gover nmen t i s potentially lia-
ble f or $ 10 - 15 billion in fl oo d insurance covera g e along
t h e At lan t ic Oce a n a nd Gu l f of Mex i co - one of the lar g est
liabilitie s aga i ns t the Fe de ral tre a sury.33 These c os t
es t imate s discount t h e intangible cost s s uch as huma n lives.
Th e effec ts of this f ederal promotion of de ve l opm n t
has b e en s e en directly al ong the c oa st of Rh ode I sland. A
s tudy publis h ed in the Nove mber , 1977 i s sue of Hou s ing a n d
Dev e lopmen t Re p or ter support s t he s tan d that the National
-20-
Flood Insurance Pr ogr a m tends t o en c ourage construction
on barrier beaches. Sponsore d by the Department of Hou-
sing and Urban Development, the aut h or claims that Rh ode
I sland has been most a f fe ct ed by the pr ogr a m. 34 The study
f ound that "Rhode Island lending institutions which pre-
viously had r efused to lend money for mortgage s i n h i gh
hazard areas now t ake mortgages s e cure d by flood insur anc e
on ce excl u ded " . 35 Sout h Ki ngs t own began its pa r t i c i pa t i on
in the Na t i ona l Flood Insurance Program in 1972 and it was
then that re que sts fo r building permits were submitt ed t o
the t own building inspector, in spite of the f act tha t t he
local z oning prohibition on the barrier beache s had be en
dropped in 1966.
-21-
CHAP~~BR 4
EFFE CTS OF FEDERAL , STATE, AND LOCAL REGULATI ON ON
THE DEVE LOPMENT OF RH ODE ISLAND' S BARRIE R BEACHES
The r egulation of development on the barrier b eache s
of Rhod e I sland h as b e en a ddr e sse d or a f f e c t e d by l egis l a-
tion or i g i n a t i n g in the three basic l evels of government -
f ederal, s t a t e , a nd local. Al t hough each level of g ov e r n -
ment has sh own c oncern ove r these fr a gile coa sta l e c os y s -
t e ms, legislation a t eac h l evel was not n ecessarily c om-
pl ementary and, a t times, had the effect of actually pro-
moting devel opment on those b e a ches or forcing the l owe st
l evel of g ov e r nmen t to adopt specific regulation to pro-
t ect their own interests as they were n ot b eing a de qu a t e l y
prot ected by the state or fed eral governments.
In or d e r to fully understand the legal i ssues a n d
uncertainties that have a r i s e n r egarding d evelopment on
Rh od e Island' s barrier b eaches, it is n ecessary to l oo k
at the role each level of government has played on a n
individual basis.
THE FEDERAL ROLE
The United S t a t e s Con s t i t u t ion carefully h a s preserve d
the sovereignty of each s t a te and h a s granted the f ederal
government specific p owers. An y l egislation which is
ad opted on the f ederal l evel must b e within the scope of
-22-
that s pe c i f ie d power ~ Onl y t ho se power s whi ch a re ne ces-
s a r y to r egulate a ct i v i t ies wh i ch a f fe ct many s tat es and
t heir intera ct i ons c ome wi t h i n the sc ope of the f ederal
36go ve r nment .
Th e basis f or t he Fe deral government's role and the
es t abl i s hment of fed eral programs i n t he coastal zo ne i s
bas ed on the cons t i t ut ional l y granted au t ho r i t y give n t he
Congr e s s to r egulat e co mmerce . In Gi bb ons v. Ogden , J ust-
i ce Marshal l interpreted c ommer ce to equa l trans portation
whi ch in turn equ~ls navigation.
"All navigable wate rs are under t he c ontrol
of the Uni t e d St a t es f or t he purpo s e of
r egulating a nd improving navigation.,,37
The Coa s tal Zone Manage me nt Act of 1972 (P.L. 92- 583 , 8 6
St a t 1280)
Wi t h pass a ge of the Coa s t a l Zone Mana ge ment Act i n
1972 and the s ubsequen t a me nd me nts of 1976 and 1980, t he
f ederal go ve r nme nt ha s t aken the l ead in es tabl ish i ng a
national s e t of pr i or i t ies for t he management of the na -
tion' s c oastal zone. Although originally des igned a s par t
of a national l and us e planning program, the Coasta l Zone
Mana ge men t Act ( CZIVlA) i s essent ial l y the onlt e lement of
that pr ogr a m to c ome to fruit~on. Pa s sed with es s ent i ally
unanimous support, CZ lVlA was en es sent ial s t e p f orward in
sol v i ng t he proble ms of the increasing c ompetition f or a
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limit ed r e s ource and th e l ack of any l evel of g overnm ent
a t te mpt i ng t o integrat e nati onal pr ior i t ies with the ne eds
of s tate and l ocal g ove r nments . CZ~~ wa s pas sed by Congr s s
in an e f f or t t o en co urage s tates in the devel opment and
i mpl ementation of their own coas tal manage ment progr a ms .
Pr i or to CZ~~ , l egisla tion did exis t on the s tat e
l evel t o a t te mpt t o mana ge c oastal i s sues. Gene ral ly ,
however, that l egisla tion was l argely a r esult of cr is i s
manage ment t o Ilintroduc ed t hreats ll r ather than pa r- t of a
comprehens i ve s tatewide ma nage ment effor t . To become
el i g i bl e f or f unding, czr~ out l i nes ce r tai n r equirements
f or the individual s tat e programs. 38
I. CZfVlA r equire s identifi cation of the coas tal
zone. Landwar-d b oundaries must be bas ed
on s ho re l i ne con t rols whi ch have di re ct
impact on coastal waters.
I I. CZIVUi. requires that the pr ogram def i ne
pe r missable us es of the coas t a l z one.
III. CZl"JA r equires that t he program list a l l
a reas of parti cular c on cern.
I V. UZIV1A requires that t he program es tabl ish
pr ior i t ies of us e s in the coas tal zone.
v. One of the most import ant r equire ments of
CZf1A i s t he i dentifi cation of t he means by
wh i ch t he s tat e proposes t o exer t control
ove r l and and water us es.
VI. CZr:~ r equires t hat c onsideration be g i ven
in t he program t o na tional interests.
CZMA is a voluntary l aw a nd doe s n ot r equire s tate s
t o deve lop mana gement programs . I n an e f fo r t t o en c our -
age t heir par t i cipa t ion in a national c oa stal mana gement
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program , tw o key e l e men t s we r e include d in the or ig i nal
l egis l ation. Fe deral funding in t h e fo r m of categor i cal
gr a n t s were a va i lable to tho s e states which h a d devel oped
mana g ement pl a ns an d had the m a pprov ed by the Of f i ce of
Coas t a l Zon e Manage men t with in the Nat ional Ocean i c a n d
Atmos pher ic Ad mi n i s t r a t i on of the Depar t men t of Commer c e .
In a d d i t i on , a con s is t en cy provision that r equired the
f e deral gover n men t ab ide by the individual state mana ge-
rnent programs a fte r a pproval of the plan gran te d the s t ates
s ome control over the f ederal role in their l ocal a reas .
Th is n ew a pproach provide d c oa stal states with unpre ce-
dent e d influence ove r some f ederal a c t ions . 3 9
The Coas tal Zone Managemen t Improve ment Act of 198 0
substantially a mende d the original statut e and pr ov i ded
f or the expansion of national ob je c t i ves in coa stal z on e
prot e ction. Par t i cu lar ly s igni f ican t t o the manag e men t
of the n a tion' s barrier beaches , chang e s t o sec t ion 30 3
of czrl!A " e s t abLf.s h e d an ex p l i c i t national ooa.s t.a'L pro -
t e ction policy en c ou r a g i n g s tates , working with t h e f e d-
e r a l a nd l o cal gover nme n ts a nd the public, t o deve l op
manageme n t progra ms that a ddress n ew national coas tal
pol i c ie s " . Include d a mong this n ew direction t o the states
wa s the following ob je c t i ve : 40
Manage coas tal deve l opme n t t o minimi ze l os s
of life a nd property caus ed by improper de -
velopment i n fl ood prone , s torm s urge , ge o-
l ogi cal h a zard, and e ros i on prone a r eas , or
in a r eas of s ubs iden ce a n d sal t wat er
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intrusion, a nd by destruct ion of n a tural
prot e c t i ve f eature s s u ch as beaches , dunes,
we t l a n d s , and barrier i slands.
The Nat ional Flo od I nsuran ce Program a n d Flood Disaster
Pr otec t ion Act of 1973
The Na t i onal Fl ood Insuranc e Pr ogr a m a n d Fl ood Di s as -
t er Fr ot e c t i on Act h a s b e en adm i n i s tere d by the Depa r t -
ment of Hous i ng a n d Ur ban Deve l opmen t 's Fe deral Insura n ce
Admi n i s t r a t or s i nce 1968 . The Pr ogr a m a l lows proper t y
own e r s in f l oo d prone municipalitie s which have institut e d
f lood control meas ures to pur chas e f lood insuranc e f r om
pr i va t e agen ts a t r ate s s u bs i d i zed 90% by t h e program. 4 1
Designe d t o gu ide de ve lopmen t awa y fr om fl ood prone a r eas ,
the pr ogram ha s taken a way the market con t ro l of t hese
a reas a n d e f f e ct i v e l y promot e d development.
Fe de r a l s tan dar ds a dopte d as par t of t h e Na t i ona l
Fl o od I nsu r a n c e Progr a m con cen t r a t e on r egulating the d e -
s ign of s t r uct u res in the s e a reas a n d r equire t he fol l ow-
i n g " fl ood proof i ng " me a sure s. 42
I. Th ey r equire that the l owest floor of
r esidential s t r uc t u r es be e le vated to
a bove t h e 100 y ear s t i l l water flo od
l evel.
II . They r equire that non-residential s t ruct-
ures be fl ood pro ofed t o the 100 y ear
l evel.
I I I . They require a dditi onal des ign f eature s
to minimi ze fl ood da mage t o or move ment
of s t r u c t u res a n d water a n d sewer s yste ms .
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The Na t i onal Flood I nsuran ce Program ha s h a d d i ff i culty
in e s t a b l i s h i n g r e gulatory standards wh i ch a c c omodate the
sev e re wave a c t ion and s torm surge typical of the open
o cean s h orel i n e . Des ign standards for coa stal a reas s u b -
j e c t t o h igh velocity wave a c t ion ( the V-z one on NF IP maps)
d o n ot a c cou n t for wave h eight or runup which can a c c ou n t
for a n incre a s e of a s mu ch a s 50% ove r s t ill water fl ood
l evels. 43 Figure 5 illustrat e s the e f f e c t of wa v e r u nup
and wa ve se t up on c oastal water l evels during flo oding. 44
Th is r e gulat ory e mph a s is on "fl ood pr oofin g" new str u c-
t u r es through the us e of de sign s tandar ds r a t her t han
locati on r estrictions that would prohibit de ve l opmen t i n
flood prone coa stal a r eas s uch as bar r ier b e ache s has s e r v e d
only t o complicat e stat e a n d l ocal e f fo r ts in c ontrolling
devel opment in the s e a r eas .
Wi t h Na t i on a l Fl ood Insurance Pr ogr a m s u bs i d ies s o
r e a d ily a v a i lable , i nsurance compan ie s whi ch in the ~as t
refus e d to underwrit e the high risks incurred with c on -
s t r u c t i on on barrier beach es and ban k s whi ch h ad r e f u s e d
t o i s s u e mortga g e s without insuranc e protec t ion , n ow f ound
t hat the mar ket c ontrol whi ch had wor ke d s o we l l t o r estri ct
de ve lopmen t in the pas t was e f fec t i ve l y r emove d - a nd t hat
the f e deral g ov e r n me n t wou ld pick u p t h e t ab f or this
r estriction of market c ontrol.
Th e obvious r e sult of t h is program is that certain
f l ood pro of i ng or fl ood prevent i ng me a sure s a r e r e quire d
in n ew c ons t r u c t i on on the fl ood plai n . 45 Howev e r , an d
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mor e important:
"•• • flood insurance s u s ta i n s and e ven i n-
creas e s a l r eady high de man d a n d pr operty
values in coastal areas, substantially re-
duce s financial risk of pr operty owners
f r om damag e fr om hurricanes, and t ends to
act a s a counterforce t o eff ective c oastal
fl ood plain management."46
Th e Omn i bu s Rec onciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-35)
As part of the Reaga n Administration " New Federalis mll ,
t h e Omn i bu s Re con c i l iat i on Act of 1981 wa s s ign e d into l a w
by Pre s i de n t Reagan on Augu s t 13, 19 8 1. Pr ovisions in this
Act call f or the prohibition of n ew f ederal flood ins u r ance
c overage f or n ew c on s t r u c t i on or s u b s tan t i a l improve ments
on s t r u c t u r e s on undeveloped barrier beache s a f te r October 1 ,
1983. Fl o od insurance is sued b efore that date wou l d r e ma i n
in e f f e c t r egardless of l ocation. Th e "undevelope d" barr i er
b e ache s r eferred to in the Act were identified by the De -
partment of the Interior a n d included 188 undeveloped c oas t al
b a r r ier units ', totaling 747 miles of b each in 16 state s,
that would be subj ect t o the fl ood insurance cutoff. 47
The passage of the Omn i bu s Re c on c i l iat ion Act of 198 1
signalled t o lower level s of government the continuing in-
t ention of the Re a gan Ad mi n i s t r a t i on to r educe or e l im i n a t e
th os e f ederal programs that tend to frustrat e cons erva tion
ob je c t i ves . The e l i mi n a t i on of f ederal insuranc e to b a r r i er
b e aches {i l l s erve to r eturn the a r eas t o ma r k et control
and s u b se quen t l y naturally restrict thes e sensitiv e are a s
-28-
to new development. Although it can be argued that new
construction will still take place by those few individ-
uals able to afford construction of dwellings on barrier
beaches without mortgages, the reluctance of banks to is-
sue mortgages to the vast majority of those people requiring
mortgages will serve to severely restrict any new develop-
ment in the majority of those barrier beaches designated
as undeveloped by the Department of Interior.
The Coastal Barrier Resources Act (P.L. 97-348)
Signed into law by President Reagan on October 18,
1982, the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CBRA) is another
element of the Reagan Administration's "New Federalism"
and was enacted despite the strenuous objections of the
National Association of Realtors and the National Associa-
tion of Home Builders. CBRA establishes the Coastal Bar-
rier Resources System and prohibits the expenditure of most
new federal financial assistance within the units of that
48
system. This legislation is directed specifically to the
nation's barrier beaches and recognizes their unique and
valuable role. CBRA prohibits new federal funding for
federal flood insurance, bridges, roads, sewers, economic
development, home construction, and new shoreline erosion
and stabilization projects on undeveloped barrier beaches
within the Coastal Barrier Resources System. Ex ce pt i on s
include expenditures for energy activities and exploration
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de pendent on c oastal waters, a i r and water naviga tion aids
a nd devi ces, fish and wildlife protection a nd enh an ce ment
me asur e s , nationa l s e curity activities, and disast er r e -
lie f to save human lives. 49
Se ct i on 4 of CERA es t abl ishe d the Coas t a l Bar r i er
Resour ces System which is referre d to by a s e t of ma ps
dated Apr i l 28 , 1982 (revis ed Se pt ember 30 , 1982) and fil e d
with the Commit t e e on Mer chant Mar i ne and Fi s her ie s of t h e
Hous e of Re pr esent a t i ves and t he Commi t t e e on Env i r onmen t
and public \'larks of the Sena te . Thes e ma ps delineat e t h os e
a r ea s that are treated as undeveloped f or the purpos es of
CBRA .
A thresh old of a pprox ima te l y one structur e
per five acres of f a s t land was us ed in de-
t ermining if a c oastal barrier was developed.
This threshold has b een us ed in previous
delineations of undeveloped c oastal barriers
pre pared by the De partment of the Interior.
Ar eas that excee d this threshold tend to
int erfere with natural proces s es of coasta l
barriers and, therefore, generally woul d
not f all within the definition of an undevel-
oped c oastal barrier. I t i s important t o
n ote that, f or the most par t , c oa stal bar-
r i er s a r e either much more or muchr6ess de -
vel oped than this threshold l evel. ~
Al l f ederal agenc i es that a dmi n i s t er progr ams wi th i n t he
Coastal Ba r r i er Res our ce s Sys t e m are affe cte d by CBRA . Se c-
tion 5 of CBRA s t a tes t hat new f ederal ex pe nd i t ur es and £i -
nancial a s s i s t an ce are proh i b i t e d fo r any pur po s e . The
importance of this part of CBRA cannot b e over s t a ted . Tbe
pattern of growth wi t h i n the co astal zone has be en gr ea t l y
a f f e ct ed by the numer ous f ederal e c on omi c , s oc i a l , and
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environmental programs within the zone. As many as fif-
teen federal programs were concerned with projects (such
as installation of roads, bridges, sewers, and water sup-
ply systems) that prove to be essential for community
development and growth. 5 1
The implementation of CBRA and the subsequent pro-
hibition of new federal expenditures will serve as the
common denominator that has been so sorely needed to en-
sure the viability of a national set of objectives designed
to regulate, and not promote, development on the nation's
barrier beaches.
It is important to note that Section 5 of CBRA does
not prohibit private financial transactions or banks from
issuing mortgages for homes within the extent of the
Coastal Barrier Resources System. The construction of
structures funded by state or local governments is also
not prohibited. Although private and state and local
government construction is not regulated, the absence of
federal subsidies for new insurance policies or for new
construction will serv.e to return these undeveloped areas
back to a market control which has, in the past, effectively
regulated development.
Section 8 of CBRA is designed to ensure that the
CBRA will not interfere with a state's right to protect,
rehabilitate, preserve, and restore lands within its
established boundaries and that state and local govern-
ments are free to take additional measures, consistent
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wi t h f e deral l aws, to control their coastal r es ources. 52
Till, STATE ROLE
I n 1969, a grou p of con ce r ne d citizens r ecognize d
t hat Rhode I sland' s 4 19 mil e coas t l ine , and Nar raganse tt
Bay in particular, wer e in danger. No single plan or
au t ho r i t y ex is t ed t o r egulat e the us e of thes e r e s ources,
developments that were r estricting f ut ure ch oices wer e
pro ce edi ng a t an ac ce lerat i ng r at e a nd much of t he great
valu e ha d already be en lost. The pr oble m of how c oa s t a l
r es ources s houl d be manage d be came the t opic of two year s
of intens e l egislative debate. 53
Prior t o pa s s age of the f e deral Coas tal Zone Mana ge -
ment Act, the Stat e of Rhode I sland, in 1971, enacted leg-
i slation creat i ng the Coas tal Resour ces rJIana ge.ment Council
( CRMC) (Title 46, R. I . General Laws , Se ct i ons 46-23- 1 t hrough
46- 23-1 2 ) . Th is se ve nt een me mbe r coun c i l was delegat ed
authority by the s t a te l egislature a s the principal mech-
an ism for manage ment of the s tate 's c oas t al r e s ources and
granted jurisdiction over manage ment of the s t a t e ' s c oas t a l
zone.
HAny person, firm, or gov ernmental a ge ncy
proposing any development or ope rat ion
wi thi n , abo ve , or beneath the tidal water
below the 1'JJ.H\;J mark, ext ending out t o the
ex tent of the s tate 's jurisd i ction in the
t erritorial s ea s hal l be r equired to
demonstrat e that its proposals would not
(1 ) con f l i ct with any r esources management
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plan or program; (2 ) make any area un-
s u i tabl e for any uses or activitie s to
whi ch it is a l l oca te d by a r es ources
ana gement plan or program ; or (3 ) sig-
nificantly da mage the env i r on ment of the
c oastal region . The Council shall be
author i ze d to a pprove , modify , se t c on-
ditions for , or r e je ct any such proposal ."54
In a ddi t i on , the Coun ci l was granted authority "over t ho s e
land areas ( t h os e areas above the ~ffiW mark ) where • • •
t her e is a r easonable probabil ity of confl i ct wi t h a plan
or pr ogr a m f or resources management or dama ge to the
C::'-
coastal environment " .~? Uses and a ct i v i t ie s wi t h i n t he s e
a r a s include :
I.
I I.
III.
IV.
v.
VI.
Power generating and desalination plants ,
Chemi cal or petroleum proces sing , transfer ,
or s tor age ,
Mi ne r a l s ex t ract ion ,
Sho r e l i ne protection f acilities and phys i o-
graphical f eatures ,
Intertidal s a lt marshes , and
Sewa ge t r eatment and dLs posaL and solid
wa s t e disposal facilit ies . 56
The above l egislation has , in e f fe ct , given t he 8RMC di rect
au t h or i t y ove r thos e activities that are likely to s i gn i -
ficantly a f f e ct t he shore or tidal wa t ers . 57
"The Coun c i l is the last step for in-sta t e
pe rmi t procedures a nd a ct s f ormally only
'."hen all local and ot her state approvals
have been obtained . Pe rsons propo sing
a l terat ions al ong the shoreline are in-
fo r me d by Coun c i l staff or l oc a l au t h or - 8
ities when a Coun c i l permit is r equire d . 1I 5
It is imp ortant t o no t e t hat the bur den of proof , a s
de fine d in Se ct ion 23- 6 , is not on the Stat e of Rhode I s -
l and but the perm i tte e t o a s ce r ta i n t ha t t he propos ed
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development falls within the guidelines set up under the
Council.
Although coastal regions under CRMC jurisdiction are
subject to CRMC regulations, it is emphasized here that
the Coastal Resources Management Program (CRMP) created
by the CRMC does not regulate the following activities or
land uses:
I. The Program will not have zoning controls
or powers. These will remain the respon-
sibility of local government.
II. The Program does not regulate single family
homes or control sprawl unless they have a
direct impact on coastal resources.
III. The Program will not stop all development
on altered or developed barrier beaches.
IV. The Program does not propose increased
public acquisition of recreation facil-
ities ot~er than those areas proposed in
the Bay Island Park Plan.
V. It is not a growth management program, how-
ever, the Program does direct growth away
from some key coastal resources. 59
In 1974, Rhode Island became one of the first states to
receive assistance under the Federal Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act. 60 Thus, although the Coastal Zone Management
Act provided much needed funding for the coastal zone man-
agement program within Rhode Island, the state previously
recognized the importance of its coastal resources and
set about to protect these resources through the creation
of the CRMC and adoption of the CRMP.
Three of the stated goals of the CRMC for the
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management of the Rhode Island coastal region and, in
particular barrier beaches, are stated below:
I. Protect and preserve valuable natural
and cultural resources such as historic
sites, barrier beaches, coastal ponds,
wetlands, and fishing grounds that are
vulnerable to development and misuse.
II. Protect the public from hazards brought
by floods, erosion, and the placement of
buildings and septic systems on unsuit-
able landforms and soils.
III. Establish a working partnership among
local, state, and federal governments
that insures the efficient administra-
tion of the coastal management program. 61
As delineated above, while the state has a natural
interest in the protection and preservation of its bar-
rier beaches, there are no regulations specifically deny-
ing "across the board" development on barrier beaches.
Although a brief moratorium existed in 1967 on develop-
ment following a major storm and a moratorium exists while
formulation of a revised CRMP is being sought, the state has
generally taken a reactive role rather than assuming the
lead in the regulation of development on its barrier
beaches.
The CRMC has found it necessary to assign all barrier
beaches to one of two categories as follows:
I. Altered or Developed Barrier Beaches
II. Undeveloped Barrier Beaches 62
Appendix A identifies the classification of individual
barrier beaches within the state. Criteria for the
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designation of "developed" versus "undeveloped" barrier
beaches has been based on past development history rather
than the suitability of the individual barrier beach for
any development at all. Again, this stance has left the
door open for further development on those beaches current-
ly designated as "developed" whether or not they are suit-
able for 1) further development or,2) any development at all.
THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The role of local government in the regulation of
development of the barrier beaches of Rhode Island is tied
directly to the long-standing delegation of the zoning
power from the state to the local level. The Rhode Is-
land State Legislature has authorized its municipalities
to adopt zoning regulations, building codes, and subdivi-
sion regulations and under Rhode Island Law (Chapter 54-24
General Laws) communities may restrict the use of land
subject to flooding. 63
There is also broad language glvlng muni-
cipalities the necessary powers to act for
the benefit of the community's health,
safety, and general welfare and are known
as police powers. These police powers
may be delegated to the municipalities
via enabling legislation, through the state
constitution, or state statutes granting
certain specific responsibilities.64
The ability of local governments to regulate development
through the use of its police powers (as delegated from
the state government) seems clear and well founded in
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state law.
THE~ OF SOUTH KINGSTOWN AND THE REGULATION OF DEVELOP-
MENT OF GREEN HILL BARRIER BEACH
The Town of South Kingstown has assumed a leadership
role within the State of Rhode Island with respect to
liniting development on barrier beaches and, for the pur-
poses of this paper, will be used as an example of the
role of local government in that regulation.
BACKGROUND
After the hurricane of 1954, South Kingstown zoned
Green Hill Beach (see figure 5) as a Flood Damage Zone
and thus prohibited construction on it. 65 Section VII-A
of the South Kingstown zoning ordinance, adopted October 22,
1956, stated:
Beach Danger - BD District Uses
Boat docks, fishing studes, and
small beach cabanas as conditioned
in Section X-A;
Non-building uses such as bathing
beaches, picnic areas, golf clubs,
auto parking spaces, parks or
wildlife refuges, together with
such small buildings for daytime
occupancy only whigg are auxiliary
to these uses •••
II.
In a Beach Danger (BD) district no build-
ing shall be erected or altered and no
building shall be used for any purposes
except:
I.
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The combination of this local ordinance and the inavail-
ability of flood insurance for structures on barrier
beaches effectively worked together to allow Green Hill
Beach to remain undeveloped.
In 1966, with adoption of a new zoning ordinance,
South Kingstown dropped the Beach Danger portion of their
zoning ordinance.
Reasons for this deletion are difficult
to reconstruct, however, it had been 12
years since the last hurricane and the
conditions which it had produced were no
longer fresh in anyone's mind. Moreover,
it was generally felt that the newly re-
vised state health regulations regarding
the placement of on-site sewage disposal
mechanisms would ser6e to limit develop-ment on the beaches. 7
It was not, however, until 1972, when South Kings-
town began its participation in the National Flood Insur-
ance Program that construction on Green Hill Beach sky-
rocketed. Prior to 1972, a total of 4 building permits
were issued for dwellings on the beach. In 1972 alone,
30 permits were issued by the building inspector in South
Kingstown. Table 1 further illustrates the effects of
the National Flood Insurance Program and provides data
on the subdivided lots on the barrier beaches of South
Kingstown.
The combination of a lack of a local zoning ordinance
and the willingness of banks to issue mortgages concurrent
with South Kingstown's participation in the National Flood
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TABLE 1
DEVELOPMENT ON THE BARRIER BEACHES OF SOUTH KINGSTOWN
TOTAL SUBDIVIDED LOTS - 170
* TOTAL UNDEVELOPED LOTS - 126
* TOTAL DEVELOPED LOTS - 30
*NUMBERS DO NOT EQUAL TOTAL BECAUSE SEVERAL OF THE DEVELOPED
LOTS ARE OVERSIZED
DEVELOPED LOTS
BUILDING PERMITS ISSUED PRIOR TO 1972 - 4
** BUILDING PERMITS ISSUED 1972 - 30
BUILDING PERMITS ISSUED POST 1972 - 3
**7 Of THESE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CANCELLED IN 1973 FOR REASONS
UNKNOWN
STATE RESIDENT OWNERSHIP OF DEVELOPED LOTS - 3/30 (10%)
OUT OF STATE OWNERSHIP OF DEVELOPED LOTS - 23/30 (77%)
UNKNOWN (OWNER'S RESIDENCE NOT AVAILABLE - 4/30 (13%)
IN TAX ASSESSOR'S OFFICE)
BEACHSIDE LOTS (DEVELOPED) - 14
BACKSIDE OF DUNE LOTS (DEVELOPED) - 16
TABLE 1
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Insurance Program spurred development on Green Hill Beach
to a level it had never before experienced. The lessons
of the 1938 and 1954 hurricanes, which had leveled every
existing structure on the beach at the time, were clearly
forgotten.
It was about at this time that a new awareness of
coastal zone management precipitated the idea of renewed
flood danger zoning ordinances within South Kingstown.
Events that spurred this interest included the following:
I. In June of 1973, South Kingstown voters
approved a referendum adopting a new
Zoning Enabling Act. This new enabling
legislation gave the Town of South Kings-
town statutory authorization to adopt
regulations for designated areas, and
controlling and limiting development in
such areas subject to periodic or sea-
sonal flooding.
II. The Army Corps of Engineers supplied a
set of flood maps as part of South
Kingstown's participation in the National
Flood Insurance Program. These maps
enabled the Town to delineate accurately
the areas subject to flooding so that
development in such areas could be reg-
ulated.
III. Several barrier beach reports were pub-
lished providing necessary supporting
data for zoning beaches as Flood Danger
Zones. The most important among these
was the Olsen and Grant report on Rhode
Island's Barrier Beaches: Volumes 1 and£ (cited earlier).
IV. The Rhode Island Coastal Resources Man-
agement Council, which was created in
1971, was in the process of adopting a
Management Plan impelling statewide con-
cern and aw~reness in coastal zone
management. b8
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A new amendment to the Zoning Ordinance of South Kings-
town, authorized by the Rhode Island Zoning Enabling Act,
gave the town authority to zone flood hazard areas as well
as the right to protect areas of ecological significance.
This amendment was adopted May 29, 1975 and delineated a
High Flood Danger (HFD) Zone as follows:
"Section A, Article I, Section 2, Zones and
Zoning Maps is hereby amended by adding the
following:
There shall be a High Flood Danger Zoning
District, designated as an HFD Zone."b9
With the adoption of a revised zoning ordinance in
1976, the Town of South Kingstown prohibited any use with-
in the HFD Zone which would involve 24 hour per day human
habitation in this area. Uses permitted within the zone
as a result of this zoning ordinance are listed in Appen-
dix B.70
SUMMARY
The federal government, through the power granted it
to regulate commerce, has instituted a comprehensive coastal
management program attempting to integrate national prior-
ities with state and local needs. The Rhode Island state
government (both before and after passage of the Coastal
Zone Management Act) has displayed an active interest in
its coastal resources through the creation and subsequent
operation of the CRMC. However, the local government,
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in this case South Kingstown, did not feel that its barrier
beaches were being adequately protected and were forced to
adopt zoning regulations to protect those beaches.
In a letter to the Chairman of the CRMC on February 5,
1975, the President of the South Kingstown town council
stated:
"The town council of the Town of South
Kingstown has had the opportunity to re-
view the CRMC proposed revisions to its
barrier beach policy and regulations. We
feel the proposed revisions would have many
undesirable effects upon the barrier bea-
ches within the Town of South Kingstown.
Specifically, the revisions propose that
two of the three barrier beaches in the
town be classified as "developed" bar-
rier beaches, presumably where develop-
ment (including residences) may be per-
mitted. ,,71
Mr. Gray's letter went on to say that a recent South Kings-
town Planning Department Study showed that on the 99.3
acres of Green Hill Beach there were only 30 residences;
the beach had a development capacity of 233 houses based
on then existing platted lots - therefore the beach was
only 13 percent developed with the remaining land being
oped sand dunes and bordering on a salt pond. 72 The
issuance of the 1976 CRMP included Green Hill Beach as
a "developed" beach, while the other barrier beaches in
South Kingstown (Moonstone and Browning) were classified
as "undeveloped".
Again in 1977 the Town of South Kingstown offered
comments to the CRMP dated summer 1977. South Kingstown
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found its organization, content, and the process through
which it was developed to be in the best interest of the
coastal resources of the State of Rhode Island. The Town
of South Kingstown did however, offer the following com-
ments during the public hearing for the Council's con-
sideration. 73
"Much of the coastal zone is not suitable
for development due to the areas suscept-
ibility to storms and erosion. South Kings-
town therefore, has developed a management
plan using strong zoning measures to restrict
development along its coastline. The plan is
designed to protect those areas where a signi-
ficant degree of storm damage is likely or
those where residential development would in-
crease the rate of erosion. The first zoning
measure was the adoption of a Flood Danger
District, also known as the High Flood Dan-
ger Zone. A second zoning measure was adop-
tion of the regulation in the Zoning Ordinance
requiring a 150-foot setback from an on-site
waste disposal mechanism to an intertidal salt
marsh or mean high water line of a tidal water
body."
The Town of South Kingstown felt the proposed CRMP did not
support the above mentioned effort of the town. Green Hill
Beach has been designated as "developed" and therefore,
residential development is not prohibited on it categor-
ically. South Kingstown felt it was in its own best in-
terests to not allow further development on Green Hill
Beach. However, the Council has left the possibility
open and thereby has put the local ordinance in a quest-
ionable situation. 74
It is interesting to note that, in the latest draft
revision to the CRMP - dated 25 March 1983 - Green Hill
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Beach remains classified as a "developed" barrier beach.
The classification of Green Hill Beach and other
barrier beaches within the state as "developed" is,
again, not based on suitability for development but past
development history. Keeping the hurricanes of 1938 and
1954 in mind and their impact on development history, the
Town of South Kingstown officially objected to the clas-
sification of Green Hill Beach as "developed" and took
regulation of development on Green Hill Beach into its
own hands. The resultant zoning regulations were a direct
result of the federal and state governments failure to
meet local needs. The State of Rhode Island, with a fi-
nancial interest in obtaining federal approval of its
Coastal Resources Management Plan, was forced to take a
more general view while dealing with a substantially higher
number of issues than did the local governments.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ANNICELLI CASE
The Town of South Kingstown is the only Rhode Island
municipality to attempt to limit development on its bar-
rier beaches through a zoning ordinance. Faced with a
situation in which its interest ,i n preserving barrier bea-
ches was not being adequately supported by the federal or
state governments despite their recent interest in coastal
zone management, the Town of South Kingstown took unilateral
action and on May 29, 1975 created a High Flood Danger (HFD)
Zone District.
The power of local government to protect a valuable
resource left unprotected by federal or state legislation
through zoning regulations and the exercising of its in-
herent police powers resulted in a landmark court chal-
lenge that has the potential for having significant im-
pact on not only Rhode Island's barrier beaches, but also
the unprotected barrier beaches of the nation.
liThe Town of South Kingstown is in the fore-
front of localities nationwide that are at-
tempting to mitigate the widespread adverse
consequences of hazardous development on bar-
rier beaches. Because of the short history
of such regulation, many states will look to
the decision of this court (the Rhode Island
Supreme Court) for guidance, and, if the
lower court is upheld, may in all likelihood
be deterred from instituting needed protection
for their own barrier beaches."75
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BACKGROUND
On May 8, 1975 Ida Annicelli, a Connecticut resident,
signed a purchase and sale agreement with the owner of
real estate on Green Hill Beach. Three weeks after the
agreement was signed, the South Kingstown Town Council
adopted amendments to the Zoning Ordinance creating the
HFD Zone.
On October 24, 1975 Mrs. Annicelli took title and
possession of three parcels of land on Green Hill Beach
totalling 31,750 square feet. The stated purchase price
was $16,750. Figure 6 illustrates the location of that
land on Green Hill Beach. 76
On November 19, 1975 Ida Annicelli applied to the
South Kingstown Building Inspector for a permit to con-
struct a single family dwelling on her property. At that
time, she also applied to the State Department of Health
for a permit to construct an Individual Sewage Disposal
System (ISDS). Although her application for the ISDS was
approved, her bUilding permit was denied by the Town of
South Kingstown on the grounds that a single family dwel-
ling was not permitted in an HFD Zone. Section 14.53 of
the Zoning Ordinance, entitled "Uses and Structures Prohib-
ited within the HFD Zoning District"; provides in part as
follows:
"No residential dwelling designed or used
for overnight occupancy shall be constructed
withinthe HFD Zoning District as defined
herein. This prohibition shall apply even
- 46-
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if the land within said HFD Zoning Dis-
trict is above the Base Flood Elevation."77
At this point in time, Mrs. Annicelli did not appeal
the denial of a building permit to the South Kingstown
Zoning Board of Review, but filed an action in the Super-
ior Court, Washington County, Rhode Island claiming inter
alia that the denial necessitated by the ordinance consti-
tuted;ataking of private property for public use without
just compensation, in violation of the United States and
Rhode Island Constitutions. 78 At the same time, the Town
of South Kingstown argued that construction on Green Hill
Beach was detrimental to the barrier beach ecosystem and
damage occurring during storms and flooding would endanger
lives and property. In addition, the town argued that
a taking of private property had not occurred because the
permitted uses (section 14.41 of the Zoning Ordinance) and
excepted uses (section 14.42) of the property remained. (See
Appendix B)
Not unexpectedly, Anniccelli argued that the property
was best suited for use as a single family dwelling. This
conclusion was based upon the belief that the permitted or
excepted uses were completely impractical as applied to
Annicelli's property because of the size and location of
the lot and the nature of its topography.79
"Annicelli's appraiser estimated that the
property was worth $1,000 in its present
state because none of the enumerated uses
was practical and $1,000 was, as he put it,
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the 'most anyone would pay ••• for a
spot to sit on the beach to go swimming'.
The town's appraiser opined that the property
was probably worth $8,500. However, he con-
ceded that several of the uses were imprac-
tical while denying that Annicelli was de-
prived of all reasonable or beneficial use
of her property.1I80
The Superior Court trial justice found that the HFD
Zone, as applied to Annicelli's property, constituted an
indirect confiscatory taking without compensation in vio-
lation of Articles V and XIV of the amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of
the Rhode Island Constitution. In his decision, the trial
justice concluded that the town was obliged to exercise
its powers of eminent domain to compensate Annicelli. He
determined that the effect of the HFD Zone was to return
the beach property to its natural state and that, under
these circumstances, it was inappropriate for the town to
exercise its police powers. 8 1
Judgement for Annicelli directed the South Kingstown
building inspector to issue the required building permit
on the reasoning that the single most beneficial use of
the land to Annicelli was to use it for a single family
dwelling and that removal of that particular use through
a local zoning restriction resulted in an unconstitutional
taking of private property.
The balance between the public interest in South
Kingstown to preserve barrier beaches in their natural
state and Annicelli's right to use her property as she
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sees_fit was tipped in the direction of the private
property owner. Public rights may be protected by the
exercise of the police power unless the damage to the
property owner becomes overbearing and amounts to a
confiscation. 82
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the
justice ruled that although "pecuniary loss or diminu-
tion in value is not the controlling factor in the issue
of confiscation because a property owner does not have
a vested property right in maximizing the value of his
property, in the case at hand, all reasonable or bene-
ficial use of Annicelli's property has been rendered an
impossibility (by the South Kingstown HFD zoning ordinance).,,83
However, the Superior and Supreme Courts did disagree on
one p oint. The Rhode Island Supreme Court found the
Superior Court to have erred in ordering South Kings-
town to issue a bUilding permit to~~the Annicellis.
Rather, it ruled, if the zoning ordinance limited the uses
of the land to a degree where all beneficial use has been
ruled out, then a taking has occurred and the Town of
South Kingstown is required to properly compensate the
Annicellis. It further directed that a hearing be held
to determine the fair market value of Annicelli's property.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE SUPREME COURT RULING
The consequences of the Rhode Island Supreme Court
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ruling in the Annicelli case has the potential for far
reaching effects on the ability of a local government to
exercise its police powers and zoning authority to pre-
serve barrier beaches and, in a larger sense other threat-
ened resources, in their natural state. The difference
between "taking for a public good and taking to prevent
a public harm", as defined by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, is subtle. Although there was general agreement
as to the fragile nature of the barrier beaches and sur-
rounding ecosystem, the Rhode Island courts have ruled
that prevention of construction of a single dwelling in
an area where 30 such structures already exist does, in
fact, constitute a taking for the public good. Again, it
is emphasized that the ability of the Barrier beach to
maintain development should not be based on previous
development history but its ability to withstand and adapt
to that development.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in its July 13, 1983
Opinion, stated that lithe town should have exercised its
power of eminent domain rather than its police power."
Local governments have not been delegated the power of
eminent domain.
Local governments, without use of zoning regulations
such as the HFD Zoning Ordinance, have been stripped of
their power to limit development on their barrier beaches.
Their ability to justly compensate land owners along this
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high priced real estate simply does not exist.
No town has enough money to condemn and
buy up every square foot of privately
owned beach land. If a litigant wins
compensation, on what is it to be based:
the original purchase price, or the po-
tential worth of the property if devel-
oped - but developed as what? And what
is the value if the land now becomes
ineligible for federal flood insurance?84
Financial realities presented as a result of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court ruling have effectively negated the
ability of local government to regulate development on
its barrier beaches. As a result, they have been forced
to rely on state and federal government protection.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Over the past 25 years, the demand on barrier island
resources has increased more rapidly than public institu-
tions have been able to respond. This lag has exposed an
urgent need to recognize the national interest in barrier
islands and beaches and in their conservation.8~ Despite
the rich wildlife values of these areas, their highly un-
stable nature, and their vulnerability to storms and hur·
ricanes, coastal barriers are being developed at an esti-
mated rate of 5000-6000 acres per year. 8 6 Rhode Island
has been no exception to this growth in development along
its barrier beaches. Since the last hurricane devastated
the South Shore in 1954, growth along this network of bar-
rier beaches has proceeded at unprecedented rates.
In recent years, however, there has been a growing
awareness of the valuable role of the nation's coastal
ecosystems. The federal government assumed a leadership
role in 1972 with passage of the Coastal Zone Management
Act and encouraged coastal states to develop their own
coastal zone management programs through the use of finan-
cial and "jurisdictional" incentives. Rhode Island has
been in the forefront among states in the recognition of
the value of its coastal zone and, in particular, the role
of the barrier beach in that coastal ecosystem. Even prior
to passage of the 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act, Rhode
Island had passed legislation creating a Coastal Resources
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Management Council - delegated by the state legislature
authority as the principal mechanism for management of
Rhode Island's coastal resources.
Efforts to protect barrier beaches have begun at all
levels of government. These efforts have focused on averting
what is perceived to be the greatest threat to barrier bea-
ches - unwise development. 87 Despite the apparent recog-
.
nit ion by all levels of government of the value of the na-
tion's barrier beaches, legislation has not always stemmed
development and the lack of coordination both within and
between levels of government has, at times, actually pro-
moted development. Federal tax dollars have encouraged
development of the nation's barrier beaches and subsequently
perpetuated that development by promoting extensive disaster
relief and insurance in the aftermath of hurricanes and
major storms. 88
The Federal Government has invested billions
of dollars to subsidize private development
of coastal barriers, while at the same time
acquiring other coastal barriers to protect
the fragile and environmentally sensitive
resources associated with these coastal sys-
tems. Public policy, therefore, has both
encouraged development and fostered protec-
tion. Within the last few years there has
been a recognition that these federal pro-
grams are working at cross purposes, and that
the costs of development, including the
threats to man and natural resources, are
more significant than previously understood. 89
In his 1977 Environmental Message, President Carter
stressed the consequences of continued unwise use of
this resource:
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"Coastal barrier islands (and beaches) are
a fragile buffer between wetlands and the
sea • • • many of then are unstable and not
suited for development, yet in the past the
federal government has subsidized and insured
new construction on them. Eventually, we can
expect heavy economic losses from this short-
sighted policy."gO
The National Flood Insurance Program, allowing property
owners in flood prone areas to purchase flood insurance
at rates subsidized up to 90% by the federal government,
has taken away market control of development in coastal
areas. Private property owners, previously denied mort-
gages without the necessary flood insurance, now found these
mortgages readily available. The private property owners
obtaining mortgages for homes in flood prone areas obtained
the necessary (and previously prohibitively expensive) flood
insurance through the subsidies offered by the National
Flood Insurance Program. The market control which had
worked so well in the past to restrict development was gone -
and the federal government was picking up the tab for that
loss of market control.
Although it can be argued that Rhode Island's interest
in its coastline and the subsequent efforts of its Coastal
Resources Management Council in protecting those resources
along that coastline would have occurred without the passage
of the Coastal Zone Management Act, there can be no doubt
that the financial and "jurisdictional" incentives offered
in the Coastal Zone Management Act accelerated that interest.
The Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council issued
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a comprehensive Coastal Resources Management Program and,
in 1974, Rhode Island became one of the first states to
receive assistance under the provisions of the Coastal
Zone Management Act. The Coastal Resources Management
Program was, indeed, a major step forward for Rhode Island
in the effective management of its coastal zone and
established goals of protecting and preserving the state's
barrier beaches.
However, the Program does not propose to stop all
development on the state's "altered or developed" barrier
beaches. The Coastal Resources Management Council has
found it necessary to establish a distinction between the
"altered or developed" barrier beaches and the "undeveloped"
beaches. This distinction is not meaningful for two pri-
mary reasons. First, it has not been based on the individ-
ual barrier beach's suitability for development, but past
development history. Second, the protection of the "un-
developed" barrier beaches is largely meaningless because
the majority of these beaches are owned by government or
conservation groups unlikely to push for development. It
is the "developed" barrier beaches that are not regulated
sufficiently by the Program and require protection against
development. Therefore, regardless of the dangers presented
to the community or surrounding ecosystem, the fact that a
particular barrier beach had structures on it left the door
open for further development on that barrier beach.
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Although a new emphasis on management of the nation's
coastal zone was evidenced by the passage of the Coastal
Zone Management Act and Rhode Island's Coastal Resources
Management Program reflected that renewed emphasis within
the state, local governments still had to face a marked
lack of cooperation with respect to management of their
barrier beaches due to the inability of the federal or
state governments to adequately protect that resource.
Faced with a situation in which it was forced to protect
its own interests, the Town of South Kingstown exercised
its police powers and zoning authority as delegated from
the state government to regulate development on Green Hill
Beach. However, the recent Rhode Island Supreme Court de-
cision in the Annicelli Case against South Kingstown has
effectively stripped the town of its ability to regulate
development on Green Hill Beach without properly compen-
sating the property owner. While the decision reasserts
individual property rights, it does little to show how the
public interest in protecting and preserving a valuable re-
source is to be upheld. Despite the well intentioned ef-
forts of federal legislation and state coastal programs,
the local government had been forced to protect its interest
in preserving its barrier beaches and has been prohibited
from effectively doing that with the Annicelli decision.
From this perspective, the outlook for the protection of
Green Hill Beach and the other barrier beaches within the
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state appears bleak. South Kingstown is the only Rhode
Island city or town to limit development of barrier bea-
ches. Because one town has now lost a case brought by a
landowner, it is unlikely that other towns will enter the
fray.91
On the other hand, recent federal legislation seems to
indicate a new willingness of the federal government to
specifically address barrier beach development. The pas-
sage of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981 and the
Coastal Barriers Resource Act of 1982 represent an even
more sensitive awareness of the value of the nation's bar-
rier beaches and attempt to lessen federal interference in
these areas. Whether passed by the Reagan Administration
to stem federal spending or in an honest effort to conserve
these valuable resources matters little - their impact on
the coastal zone is what matters. While recognizing the
federal government should not dictate what private property
owners do with their property, the American taxpayer should
not be expected to subsidize the recurring costs and high
risks of private development on barrier beaches. The new
legislation also provides the framework for a consistent
and reduced federal role regarding undeveloped coastal
barriers. 92
Provisions in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act call for
the prohibition of new federal flood insurance for new
construction or substantial improvements on structures on
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undeveloped barrier beaches after October 1, 1983. Although
it can be argued that new construction will still take place
by those few individuals able to afford construction on bar-
rier beaches without mortgages, it is now those ind~viduals
that are forced to assume the risks associated with con-
struction in these flood prone areas and not the federal
government. The unwillingness of banks to issue mortgages
without flood insurance will serve to restrict new devel-
opment by returning these coastal areas to a market control.
The Coastal Barrier Resources Act prohibits new fed-
eral funding for federal flood insurance, bridges, roads,
sewers, economic development, home construction, and new
shoreline erosion and stabilization projects on undeveloped
barrier beaches within the Coastal Barrier Resources System.
The importance of this legislature can not be overstated.
The pattern of growth around the coastal zone and on barrier
beaches has largely been fueled by the numerous federal
economic, social, and environmental programs within the
zone. Although private and state and local government con-
struction is not prohibited, again, the absence of federal
subsidies will serve to return these undeveloped areas back
to market control.
The outlook for the barrier beaches of Rhode Island
is better than it has ever been in the recent past, pri-
marily due to the passage of the Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1981 and the Coastal Barrier Resources Act and the
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elimination of federal incentives fQr barrier beach
development. state coastal policy has not protected local
interests with respect to "developed" barrier beaches and
has forced local government to issue restrictive zoning
ordinances that have been subjected to legal action. How-
ever, the outcome of this litigation is less important,
at least to the Town of South Kingstown, now that Green
Hill Beach has been designated as an undeveloped beach
within the Coa s t a l Barrier Resources System. The door is
still open, however, for the further private development
on other "developed" barrier beaches throughout the state.
Although the implementation of the Omn i bus Reconcil-
iation Act of 1981 and the Coastal Barrier Resources Act
protects the barrier beaches from further federal devel-
opment and subsidies and attempts to treat the development
problem at its source, the barrier beaches within Rhode
Island remain threatened. In light of the recent limitation
of a local government's ability to restrict development
through zoning ordinances, it is evident that those barrier
beaches regarded by the state Coastal Resources Management
Program as "developed" need stronger management from the
state level. Now that the federal government has signifi-
cantly reduced its role in the development of barrier bea-
ches, it is -t i me for the state to tailor its Coastal Re-
sources Management Program to fit local needs.
Regardless of the legal situation within Rhode Island,
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it is only a matter of time before another hurricane or
major storm demonstrates its long forgotten power and wreaks
havoc on the state's barrier beaches. Certainly then, the
need will be demonstrated for the clear-cut state manage-
ment program for the "developed" barrier beaches that is
so desperately needed.
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APPENDIX A
DEVELOPED AND UNDEVELOPED BARRIER BEACHES*
Developed
Atlantic Beach, Westerly
Central Beach, Charlestown
East Beach, Charlestown
Charlestown Beach, Charlestown 1
Green Hill Beach, South Kingstown 1
East Matunuck-Jerusalem Beach, South Kingstown-Narragansett
Roger Wheeler Beach (Sand Hill Cove), Narragansett
Narragansett Beach, Narragansett
Bonnet Shores Beach, Narragansett
Mackerel Cove Beach, Jamestown
Hazard's Beach, Newport
Bailey's Beach, Newport
First (Easton's) Beach, Newport
Second (Sachuest) Beach, Middletown
Third Beach, Middletown
Tunipus (South Shore) Beach, Little Compton
Crescent Beach, New Shoreham
Watchhouse Pond Beach, Little Compton
Sakonnet Harbor Beach, Little Compton 1
Conimicut Point, Warwick
Undeveloped
Napatree Beach, Westerly1
Maschaug Beach, Westerly1
Quonochontaug Beach, Westerly-Charlestown1
East Beach(Ninigret Conservation Area to Charlestown Breachway)1
Moonstone Beach, South Kingstown
Browning Beach, South Kingstown
Long Pond Beach, Little Compton 1
Round Pond Beach, Little com~ton1
Briggs Beach, Little Compton
Ship Pond Cove, Little Compton
Round Meadow Pond Beach, Little Compton
Quicksand Pond Beach, Lit1le Compton 1
Sandy Point, New Shoreham
West Beach, New Shoreham 1
Casey Point, North Kingstown 1
Bissill Cove, North Kingstown~
Greene Point, North Kingstown
Tibbitts Creek, North Kingstown
Gull Point, Portsmouth (Prudence Island)
Coggeshall/Sheep Pen Coves, Portsmouth (Prudence Island)1
* As listed in Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management
Program Draft Revisions (Dated March 25, 1983)
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McCurry Point, Portsmouth
High Hill Marsh Barrier~ Little Compton 1
Fogland Point, Tiverton
Sapowet Point Barrier, Tiverton
Fox Hill Pond, Jamestown
Mary's Creek, Warwick
Baker's Creek, Warwick
Buttonwoods Cove, Warwick
Gaspee Point, Warwick
Nayatt Point, Barrington
Mussachuk Creek, Barrington
Rumstick Point, BarlingtonHog Island, Bristol
Musselbed Shoals, Portsmouth
Nag Pond, Portsmouth 1
Jenny Pond, Portsmouth 1
1Denotes those barrier beaches or portions thereof where
federal flood insurance will not be granted persuant to
the Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 1982.
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APPENTIIX B
USES ALLOWED IN FLOOD DANGER ZONING DISTRICT
S - By Special ~xception Only
P - Permitted
1. Field Crop Farms S
2. Livestock Farms S
3. General Crop and Livestock Farm S
4. Horticultural Nursery S
5. Fish Hatcheries S
6. Parking or Outdoor Storage af One (1) Com- S
mercial vehicle of up to 1~ ton capacity
on a lot
7. Indoor or screened Outdoor Storage of no more S
than three (3) Commercial Vehicles of less
than 1~ ton capacity not including any acces-
sory Machinery and Equipment for such, where
not an accessory use to a permitted princi-
pal use
8. Ship and Boat Building and Repairing S
9. Commercial Dock or Pier S
10. Utility Substation or Pumping Station S
11. Sales of Fruit and Vegetables Produce Raised P
on the Premises
12. Storage, Repair, and Sales of Boats and Mar- S
ine Accessories
13. Lunchroom or Restaurant (no alcoholic bever- S
ages)
14. Bicycle Sales, Rentals (including repairs) S
15. Marine Oriented Supplies and Bait (inclu- S
ding rental)
16. Off-Street Automobile Parking Facility Acces- P
ory to a permitted use
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17. Commercial Off-Street Parking Lot
18. Government-owned Building (except penal, gar-
age, or utility)
19. Tent Camps
20. Golf Course
21. Boat Liveries (small boat rentals)
22. Marinas
23. Bathing Beaches
24. Individual Beach Cabanas, Dressing Rooms, or
Bathhouse
25. Beach Club or Yacht Club
26. Bathing Pavilion
27. Conservation Lands, Wildlife Areas, Nature
Preserves
28. Private Parks, including subdivision parks
29. Campgrounds (non-profit)
30. Indoor and/or Outdoor Private Non-Profit
Recreation not elsewhere classified
31. Any accessory use customarily incident to a
use permitted in the district and located on
the same lot as the permitted use
32. Any accessory use customarily incident to a use
permitted as a special exception in the district
and located on the same lot as the permitted use
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